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Jim Crow Ethics and the Defense of the
Jena Six
Anthony V Alfieri*
"Remember/The days of bondage" 1
ABSTRACT: This Article is the second in a three-part series on the 2006
prosecution and defense of the Jena Six in LaSalle Parish,Louisiana. The
series, in turn, is part of a larger, ongoing project investigatingthe role of
race, lawyers, and ethics in the American criminal-justice system. The
purpose of the project is to understand the race-based, identity-making norms
and practices of prosecutors and defenders in order to craft alternative civilrights and criminal-justicestrategies in cases of racially-motivatedviolence.
To that end, this Article revisits the prosecution and defense of theJena Six
in the hope of uncovering the professional norms of practice under de jure
and defacto conditions of racialsegregation, a set of norms I callJim Crow
legal ethics. Jim Crow ethical norms condone and oftentimes encourage
coded claims of race-based identity in describing individual black offenders
as culturally and socially inferior, and, thus, in publicly shaping the
collective histories of black-offender communities.
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1.

Langston Hughes, Remember, 193 POETRY 331 (2009) [hereinafter Hughes, Remember].

Recently, a librarian at the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University
discovered three of Langston Hughes's poems-Remember, You and Your Whole Race, and I Look at
the World-written in pencil on the endpapers of Hughes's edition of An Anthology of
Revolutionary Poetry (1929). See generally Arnold Rampersad, Introduction, 193 POETRY 327 (2009)

(discussing Hughes's three poems, which are presented in the journal on the pages following
the introduction).
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Instead of rehearsing the Jim Crow norms and narratives typically
constructing the identity and history of black offenders, such as "rotten
social background" and "black rage," this Article addresses a more
provocative claim: that of the "natural"criminal pathology of black male
offenders, what I call the antebellum defense. Proffered as an excuse or as a
mitigating circumstance, the antebellum defense offers coded racial
narratives to diminish the mental capacity and moral character of black
offenders and their communities. Under the standard conception of
criminal-defense ethics, the antebellum defense permits defenders to excuse
black male lawbreaking for reasons of "innate" criminal character,rather
than environmental deprivation, cultural deviance, or socioeconomic
oppression. Heard at trial and on appeal, the defense finds justification in
the instrumentalreasoning of conventional lawyer-adversarialdiscretion.
The defender discretion to assert the antebellum defense in the Jena Six case
and elsewhere raises troubling questions of lawyer morality in the criminaljustice system. To evaluate the morality of the antebellum defense for the
Jena Six, this Article turns to David Luban's recent writings on legal ethics
and human dignity, juxtaposing the standard adversarial conception of
criminal-defense ethics against his dignitary conception of ethics, here
enlarged by identity-affirming, dignity-restoring, and communityempowering norms of advocacy. Guided by these and other integrity norms,
Luban's alternative dignitary conception provides moral direction to civilrights and criminal-justiceadvocates in cases of racially motivated violence.

I. INTRO DUCTION ...................................................
1654
II.

T HEJENA SIX .....................................................
1662
A. TnE PROSECUTIONOF THEJFA Six ............................
1665
B. THE DEFENSE OF THEJENA Six ......................................
1666

III. THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF CRIMINAL-DEFENSE ETHICS .............
1668
A.

B.

THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM ..........................................
1669

1. Adversary Principles .....................................
1670
2. Adversary Contexts .....................................
1671
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM ...........................
1672
1. ConsequentialistJustifications .............................
1672
2. NonconsequentialistJustifications ..........................
1673
3. Pragmatic Justifications ..................................
1675

V. A DIGNITARY CONCEPTION OF CRIMINAL-DEFENSE ETHICS .................
1677
A.

DIGNITY, STORY, AND VOICE .......................................
1677

1. Paternalism ..........................................
1680
2. Self-H um iliation .......................................
1681

THE DEFENSE OF THEJENA SIX

1653

3. Non-Humiliation .................................................................
IDENTITY, DIGNITY, AND COMMUNITY ............................................
1. Identity-Affirming Relations ................................................
2. Dignity-Restoring Relations .................................................
3. Community-Empowering Relations ....................................

1682
1683
1684
1687
1688

V. CONTRIVED IGNORANCE AND INTEGRITY IN CRIMINAL-DEFENSE
ETHICS ................................................................................................
A.
WILLFUL IGNORANCE .....................................................................
1. The Structure of Contrived Ignorance ...............................
2. The Locus of W rongdoing ..................................................
3. W illful Blindness ..................................................................
B. INTEGRITY AND DISSONANCE ..........................................................
1. Counterattitudinal Advocacy ...............................................
2. Situationism .........................................................................
3. Integrity ................................................................................

1689
1691
1692
1692
1693
1695
1696
1698
1698

B.

VI.

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1699

1654

94 IOWA LA WREVIEW

I.

[2009]

INTRODUCTION

2
"The hungry wretched thing you are today."

This Article revisits the legal-political controversy surrounding the 2006
prosecution of the Jena Six in LaSalle Parish, Louisiana. In a prior work, I
investigated the racial norms animating the Jena Six prosecution, a set of
norms I called Jim Crow legal ethics. 3 By Jim Crow legal ethics, I mean the
professional norms of practice under de jure and de facto conditions of
racial segregation. 4 The interwoven product of law, culture, and society, the
norms condone and oftentimes encourage coded claims of race-based
identity. Race-coded claims advert to both mutable and immutable
characteristics in describing individuals, groups, and communities. Mutable
traits pertain to the changeable elements of an individual's legal personality,
for example, education, geography, or socioeconomic status. Immutable
qualities refer to the more constant properties of an individual's legal
personality, for example, accent, skin color, or disability. For lawyers
working within the criminal-justice system in a time of de jure or facto
segregation, race-coded claims shape the image 5 and story 6 of offenders,
victims, and affected communities.

2. Hughes, Remember, supranote 1, at 331.
3. SeeAnthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingtheJena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2008); see
also Kathryn M. Caretti & N. Pieter M. O'Leary, The Story of theJena Six: The Interplay of History,
Hate Crimes, Racial Inequality, and Legal Justice in Jena, Louisiana, 1 HuM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION
L. REV. 3, 5-20 (2007-2008) (reviewing the history of hate crimes and the circumstances of the
Jena Six); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors' Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (examining prosecutorial discretion in light of the Jena Six incident). For
recent studies of Jim Crow traditions, see generally James W. Fox Jr., DoctrinalMyths and the
Management of CognitiveDissonance: Race,Law, and the Supreme Court'sDoctrinal Support ofJim Crow,
34 STETSON L. REV. 293 (2005); Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy ofJim Crow: The Enduring Taboo of
Black-White Romance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 739 (2006) (book review).
4. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1285. For useful work on the professional norms of practice in
advocacy and adjudication during periods of de jure and de facto racial segregation, see
ROBERT M. COVER,JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987);
Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAw& HIST. REV.
97 (2002); see asoJudith Kilpatrick, Race Expectations: Arkansas African-American Attorneys (18651950), 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 63, 63-64, 75-78 (2001) (examining evolution of
strategies used by African-American lawyers in local context).
5. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The
Relationship Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in Southern
Antebellum and Modem Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (1995) (linking juridical
imagery to criminal-law ideology); Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair
Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the
Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69 (1995) (examining the
interweaving of narratives of black inferiority and white superiority in the fair-housing context).
6. See Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of
Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 946 (2006) (explicating narratives to "chart[] the space
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In previous work investigating the role of race, lawyers, and ethics in the
American criminal-justice system, I examined the identity-making practices
of prosecutors 7 and defenders8 in cases of racially motivated violence. This
Article extends that project by exploring race-based, identity-making
practices in the law, lawyering, and ethics of noose cases. By noose cases, I
mean civil and criminal cases arising out of noose-related conduct motivated
by bias or prejudice and intended to harass, intimidate, or terrorize
particular individuals, groups, or communities. 9 The goal of this exploration
is to craft alternative civil-rights and criminal-justice approaches to nooserelated incidents of racial violence.
Traditionally, prosecutors, defenders, and civil-rights lawyers have
overlooked "outsider" theories of difference-based identity in representing
offenders, victims, and offender or victim communities. Outsider theories
provide cultural, political, and socioeconomic accounts of the inequitable,
10
difference-based treatment of minority communities in American law.
Identity, embedded in the cultural, legal, and social norms and narratives of
difference, resonates throughout the diverse minority communities served
by prosecutors, defenders, and civil-rights groups. The prosecution and
defense of noose cases illuminate the professional norms, practice
traditions, and ethics rules governing the fields of civil rights and criminal
justice and, more specifically, accentuate the particularized role of lawyers in

between law as it is imagined and law as it is experienced"); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text:
Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public
Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 743 (1995) (examining the role of
cultural images on television and their impact on criminal trials); Reginald Leamon Robinson,
Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social Construction of the Black Self 40 HOW. L.J. 1 (1996)

(discussing the importance of narratives, and the social depiction of individuals and groups, in
maintaining traditional legal methodologies).
7. Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting
Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REv. 809 (2000); Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race,

101 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (2003) [hereinafter Alfieri, RetryingRace].
8. Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Gideon in White/Gideon in Black: Race and Identity in Lawyering, 114 YALE L.J. 1459
(2005); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REv.
1063 (1997); Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty

Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 325 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Caretti & O'Leary, supra note 3, at 36 (arguing for the criminalization of
"hanging nooses in public with the intent to 'send a message'"); Allison Barger, Note, Changing
State Laws to Prohibit the Display of Hangman's Nooses: Tightening the Knot Around the First
Amendment?, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 263, 282-91 (2008) (discussing noose cases in private
residences, employment settings, and on school grounds).
10.

Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L.

REv. 805,835-36 (2008) (exploring different theoretical frameworks illuminating identity).
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constructing the meaning of racial violence and the noose in law, culture,
and society. 1 1
Like the initial prosecution mounted against the Jena Six by LaSalle
Parish District Attorney Reed Walters, the defense of the Jena Six implicates
the sociolegal norms and narratives of racial identity. Rooted in the
conscious 12 and unconscious13 racism of Jim Crow practices, the norms and
narratives construct the identity14 and history1 5 of black offenders and black
communities. 16 Frequently, contemporary defense narratives in race cases
will construct black-offender identity through the familiar tropes of "rotten
social

background,"' 17

"black

rage,"' 8

and

"white

fear," 19

or

related

11. Since the 2006 hanging of schoolyard nooses by white teenagers in Jena, Louisiana
and the subsequent arrest of six black teenagers for the beating of a white student atJena High
School, civil-rights groups and law-enforcement officials have documented more than seventyeight instances of noose-related displays. Diversitylnc, Noose Watch, http://www.diversityinc.
com/public/2588.cfm (last visited July 3, 2009); see also Miguel Bustillo, Nooses Stir a Year of
Racial Unrest, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15. 2007, at A9 (describing the use of nooses to harass the Jena
Six); Phillip Dray, Noose-The True History of a Resurgent Symbol of Hate, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2,
2007, at El (reporting on the use of nooses in racial-harassment incidents since the Jena Six
case gained widespread notoriety); Erin Haines, Rash of Noose Incidents Reported Across the Country
in Wake ofJena Six Case, PRESS REG. (Mobile, Ala.), Oct. 11, 2007, at B2 (same).
12. See Thomas Ross, Instrumental Racism: A Convenient Untruth, 50 HOw. L.J. 685, 698
(2007) (discussing how racism "infects" some individuals at the conscious level).
13. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("[A] large part of the behavior that
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation."); Eva Paterson
et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence's
Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine,40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (2008)
(stating that unconscious racism is "becoming increasingly mainstream").
14. See I. Bennett Capers, The Trial of Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender, and Trespass, 31 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 15-25 (2006) (reviewing "three 'real life' cases [that] informed
[Richard] Wright as he was drafting [his book] Native Son"). See generally N. Jeremi Duru, The
CentralPark Five, the Scottsboro Buys, and the Myth of the BestialBlack Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315
(2004) (appraising cases that serve as the foundation for the "myth of the Bestial Black Man");
Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Veriti and the
Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347 (1996) (discussing the film WHO KILLED
VINCENT CHIN? (PBS 1989) and its pedagogical value).
15. See generally James H. Coleman, Jr., The Role of the Legal Profession and the Judiciary in
Creatingand Defining Black History, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 573 (2001) (chronicling the animating
force of advocacy and adjudication in black history).
16. See generally HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY xii (1988) ("Violence ... has constituted an ever-present
reality in practically every black community .... ."); Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "Its

Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992) (discussing the
debate produced by black criminal behavior and its impact on the "ideal of 'the black
community'").
17. See Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 12-22 (1985) (assessing "rotten
social background" as a criminal defense); see also Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in
FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL

LAw 114, 114 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (arguing that "creating a
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"cultural" 20 and "syndrome" 21 attributions. Rather than rehearse the shared
form and substance of these implicit race-coded claims, this Article
addresses a more explicit and provocative claim: that of the "natural"
criminal pathology of black male offenders. Forged in a time of de jure and

'deprivation excuse' will not contribute to social justice for the worst off members of our
society"); SAUNDRA DAVIS WESTERVELT, SHIFTING THE BLAME: How VICTIMIZATION BECAME A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE 51-58 (1999) (discussing the development of the "rotten social background"
defense). See generally David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385,
401-05 (1976) (discussing the social and economic causes of crime); Richard Delgado,
Commentary, Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA-Getting a
Little More PreciseAbout Racialized Narratives,77 TEX. L. REV. 1571 (1999) (examining the role of
racialized narratives in determining civil and criminal outcomes).
18.

See generally PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW (1997) (tracing the

development of the black-rage defense); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based
upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74
N.C. L. REV. 731 (1996) (classifying the black-rage defense as a variant of established criminallaw doctrine); Kimberly M. Copp, Note, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1995) (discussing the legitimacy of the black-rage defense and the
jurisprudential ramifications of its acceptance); Deborah L. Goldklang, Note, Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorderand Black Rage: Clinical Validity, Criminal Responsibility, 5 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 213
(1997) (asserting the validity of the black-rage defense);Judd F. Sneirson, Comment, Black Rage
and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a PolarizedDebate, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2251 (1995)
(arguing that the use of the black-rage defense produces a troubling result).
19.

See generallyJODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN

COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997) (discussing racial fears and criminal defenses);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears-On the Social Construction of
Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994) (analyzing the social construction of white fears); Camille A.
Nelson, Consistently Revealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of Fearin the CriminalLaw, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1261 (2004) (positing the relationship between fear and criminal-law doctrine).
20.

See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN

THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 96-124 (2003) (evaluating the cultural defense); Alison Dundes
Renteln, Raising CulturalDefenses, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 423, 423-66 (Linda
Friedman Ramirez ed., 2d ed. 2007) (discussing the cultural defense in trial practice); Rashmi
Goel, Can ICall Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in the CulturalDefense, 3 SEATTLEJ. SOC. JUST. 443
(2004) (considering whether widely held cultural beliefs may be considered insane); Nancy S.
Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal Treatment of Cultural Defense
Defendants, 17 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199 (2006) (suggesting that when crime definitions "fail
to capture the moral blameworthniess" of cultural-defense defendants, courts reach unfair
decisions); Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the CulturalDefense,
49 ARIz. L. REV. 911, 915-21 (2007) (describing the use of the term cultural defense); Alison
Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as PartialExcuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 437, 490-91 (1993) (offering "arguments in favor of the establishment of an
official 'cultural defense'").
21. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461 (1996) (placing "syndrome evidence into context as a type of proof
designed, inter alia, to educate jurors about typical human behavior in response to specified
conditions"); Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgment in the CriminalLaw, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (1998) (reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL
JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM (1997)) (critiquing Wilson's

account of the "abuse excuse"); Demetra L. Liggins, Note, Urban Survival Syndrome: Novel Concept
or Recognized Defense, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215 (1999) (discussing the use of Urban Survival
Syndrome as a criminal defense).
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de facto racial segregation, this claim informs what I will call the antebellum
defense.
Akin to other race-based defenses, the antebellum defense offers coded
narratives to diminish the mental capacity and moral character of black
offenders and their communities. At trial, the defense serves as an excuse. At
sentencing, it supplies evidence of mitigation or grounds for mercy. In the
Jena Six case and other black-on-white cases of racial violence, it permits
criminal-defense lawyers to excuse black male lawbreaking for reasons of
"innate" criminal character instead of environmental deprivation, cultural
deviance, or historical oppression. The question in this case and cases
elsewhere is not whether the defense is ethically permissible or strategically
instrumental, but whether it is morally acceptable.
Here, in fact, the antebellum defense is omitted in favor of colorblind
and race-coded defenses asserted at successive trial and post-conviction
proceedings. The absence of the defense, however, is a function of strategic
considerations relevant to the past and future actions of an unsympathetic
white prosecutor, an intolerant white judge, and an all-white jury, and the
higher consequent risk of retributive punishment, rather than a scarcity of
"facts" pertaining to potential claims of offender criminal pathology.
Whether authentic or pretextual, bad-character or criminal-pathology claims
are almost always available in defending young black male lawbreakers. In
the adversary system of criminal-justice advocacy, the presence or absence of
such claims turns on strategic calculation, not ethical constraint.
To evaluate the moral import of the antebellum defense for the Jena
Six specifically and for young black male lawbreakers more generally, this
Article turns to David Luban's recent writings on legal ethics and human
dignity. 22 Luban links lawyers to the preservation of client dignity in the
advocacy relationships molded by law, legal agents, and sociolegal
institutions. 23 Winnowing out the professional norms of advocacy, he
provides a naturalized account of legal ethics and lawyers' roles where
human dignity operates "as a relationship among people in which they are
not humiliated." 24 Under this common-sense account, human dignity exists

DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007) [hereinafter LUBAN, LEGAL
22.
ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY]; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY

(1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE] (examining the role of morality in the
profession of law). For helpful commentary on Luban's writings, see generally Colloquium,
DiscussingDavid Luban's Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, 93 CORNELLL. REV. 1285 (2008).
23. See DAVID LUBAN, Lauryers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy
Assaulting It), in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 22, at 65, 65-95
[hereinafter LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity] (arguing "that what makes the practice of law
worthwhile is human dignity... [and] that adversarial excesses are wrong precisely when they
assault human dignity instead of upholding it"); see also Katherine R. Kruse, The Human Dignity
of Clients, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1343 (2008) (discussing Luban's idea that the law and the people
it governs intersect at the lawyer-client relationship).
24. LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 22, at 6.
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in "relations among people, rather than as a metaphysical property of
individuals." 25 For Luban, legal institutions and their agents "violate human
dignity when they humiliate people." 26 Accordingly, "non-humiliation"
functions as a "proxy for honoring human dignity" in law and legal
advocacy.

27

Engrafted on the defense of the Jena Six, Luban's dignitary conception
departs meaningfully from the standard adversarial conception of criminaljustice ethics. As I have argued elsewhere, the standard conception affords a
"colorblind account of legal ethics and lawyers' roles,"2 8 but permits racecoded "norms of adversarial competition" to "shape the roles and
relationships" among prosecutors and defenders, offenders and victims, and
courts and communities.29 An outsider conception, I have argued by way of
comparison, furnishes "a difference-based, anti-subordination account of
legal ethics and lawyers' roles" that reshape existing prosecutor and
defender relationships. 30 That race-conscious account, I have maintained,
draws on the rebellious "identity norms of the civil rights movement and
critical theories of race to resist the marginalization of people"-offenders
31
and victims-"in legal relationships" within the criminal-justice system.
Both overtly and covertly inflicted, marginalization damages human dignity
by casting an offender or victim as inferior and by reducing an offender or
32
victim to the status of an object.

25.

Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1287; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race
Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1456 (2002)
(remarking on the deeply contested nature of the "colorblindness principle" in constitutional
law); Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities". Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness,

59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007) ("[Olne can trace a general shift over the twentieth century
from colorblindness as a progressive demand to a reactionary one.").
29. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1287; see also Abbe Smith, Commentary, Burdening the Least of
Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1597 (1999) (discounting
"the social harm caused by criminal defense lawyers and their advocacy strategies"). See generally
Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the O.J.
Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291 (1998) (discussing the ethical quandaries
posed by the O.J. Simpson criminal trial); Eva S. Nilsen, The CriminalDefense Lawyer's Reliance on
Bias and Prejudice, 8 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994) (discussing the ethical issues faced by law
students in criminal-defense clinics).
30. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1287. For an exposition of antisubordination norms in race
cases, see generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordinationand Anticlassification Values in
ConstitutionalStruggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
31. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1287.
32. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2128 (1991) ("Hierarchy institutionalizes the transformation of
the private subject seeking help into the public object: 'client.'"); Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560 (1989) ("The claim of pervasive unconscious racism is
easily devalued.... Nonetheless, the claim is well founded.").
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Critical race theory seeks "to locate and overturn subordinating racial
identities and racialized narratives in law, culture, and society. '3 3 The
movement and its progeny "give rise to a transformative account of legal
ethics and lawyers' roles that emphasize the normative values of differencebased client identity and community-incited legal-political resistance to
racial inequality." 3 4 Borrowing from Luban's alternative conception of legal
ethics, the account gains strength from the integration of racial identity and
human-dignity norms, and, equally important, from the corresponding
merger of non-humiliation and antisubordination narratives.
Despite this combined strength, the Luban-inspired, identity-based
account put forward here struggles in the criminal context of the Jena Six.
Like other race cases wrought from a noose, the Jena Six present the
"special case" of criminal-defense practice where, according to Luban,
zealous advocacy serves the "atypical" political ends and social goals of
curtailing the state's power to prosecute and to punish its most vulnerable
citizens, 35 including young black males. In this special case, as with the Jena
Six, Luban elevates the political goal of protecting individual liberty against
state encroachment to the same rank as the social goal of attaining legal
justice. 36 Luban notes that zealous advocacy is crucial to this elevated
standing because it provides an "exceptional means" of achieving the central
goal of individual protection. 37 In appropriate circumstances, as here, the
antebellum defense supplies the race-coded means to that end.
Neither the political goal of safeguarding liberty, nor the social goal of
legal justice, however, exhausts the normative aims of criminal offenders,
defenders, or the criminal-justice system. For some offenders, the
affirmation of racial dignity, the expression of racial identity, and the
empowerment of racial community may be of equal or greater import than
the political aims of defenders or the sociolegal goals of the criminaljustice
system. Thus, for some offenders, their families, and their communities, the
antebellum defense may prove to be an unacceptable means to a legitimate
end. Here and elsewhere, the legitimacy of safeguarding individual liberty,
particularly the liberty of marginalized and hyper-marginalized young black

33. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1288; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Color/Identity/Justice:Chicano
Trias,53 DUKE L.J. 1569, 1599-1600 (2004) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ,RACISM ON TRIAL: THE
CHICANO FIGHT FORJUSTICE (2003)) (discussing LitCrit Theory); Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching the
Law of Race, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1607-09, 1624 (2001) (reviewingJuAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE
AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2000)) (discussing the genealogy of
race and racism).
34. Alfieri, supra note 3,at 1288; see also Alfieri, supra note 10, at 835-36, 844 ("By situating
identity in law, culture, and society, critical theory supplies a range of insights and interventions
to law students striving to meet individual, group, and community needs.").
35.

DAVID LUBAN,

The Adversary System Excuse, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN

DIGNITY, supranote 22, at 19, 30 [hereinafter LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse].
36.

LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supranote 22, at 6.

37.

Id.
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male offenders, suffers little or no doubt. 38 Likewise, the instrumental
rationality of appealing to the racial passions or prejudices of judges, jurors,
and prosecutors in strategically advantageous circumstances invites little or
no dissent from defenders. 3 9 Objection, when it comes, stems from the
humiliation of individual offenders, the silencing of their identity-infused
voices and stories, and the political and socioeconomic disempowerment of
their communities.
The standard adversarial conception of criminal-justice ethics gives
defenders the discretion to commit these normative and political
transgressions without moral accountability or consequence. More narrowly
tailored to the "special case" of criminal-defense practice presented by the
Jena Six, Luban's dignitary conception of ethics permits the same
'jurispathic" result, a result destructive of the values of difference-based
dignity, identity, and community. 40 Indeed, Luban's conception ratifies the
general moral propriety of this result. The integrity of criminal-defense
advocacy under Luban's dignitary conception of ethics, especially the
availability of the antebellum defense, ultimately depends on the resolution
of the competing normative and political aims underlying the "special case"
of race and the noose.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part II describes the history,
prosecution, and defense of the Jena Six. Part III considers the antebellum
defense of the Jena Six under the standard conception of criminal-defense
ethics. Part IV analyzes the antebellum defense under a dignitary conception
of criminal-defense ethics tied to identity-affirming, dignity-restoring, and
community-empowering advocacy relationships. Part V examines the
tensions between the antebellum defense and the dignitary conception of
criminal-defense ethics, particularly the countervailing tendencies toward
contrived ignorance and integrity.

38.

Id.

39. On strategies ofjury nullification, see Paul Butler, Racially BasedJury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700-12 (1995) (defending jury
nullification, Butler argues that "it is both lawful and morally right that black jurors consider
race in reaching verdicts in criminal cases"); Long X. Do, Comment, Jury Nullification and RaceConscious ReasonableDoubt: OverlappingReifications of CommonsenseJustice and the PotentialVoir Dire
Mistake, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1843, 1847-53 (2000) (weighing Professor Butler's proposal that
"black jurors disregard the law and acquit black defendants").
40. The term "jurispathic" comes from Professor Robert Cover. Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 40-44 (1983); see

also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1721, 1728 n.33 (1994) (book review) ("'[Cover] coined the term jurispathic to refer to the
power and practice of a government that rules by displacing, suppressing, or exterminating
values that run counter to its own.'") (quoting Martha Minow, Introduction:Robert Cover and Law,
Judging, and Violence, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAw: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 1, 1-

2 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992)).
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THEJENA SIX

The antebellum racial history of the town ofJena in central Louisiana's
LaSalle Parish forms the backdrop for the prosecution and defense of the
Jena Six. 4 1 Jena is the largest town in LaSalle Parish. 42 The parish
43
population comprises 14,000 people, twelve percent of whom are black.
The smaller town population includes 750 families with approximately 3000
total residents, of whom fifteen percent are black. 44 The town is "rigidly"
divided along a nineteenth-century color line-its homes, churches, and
cemeteries all stand "segregated." 45 The black population holds "little
political power." 46 Only one black resident, for example, serves on the tenperson parish government, only one serves on the nine-member school
board, and only one serves in the Jena Police Department. 47 Only two black
teachers work in the Jena public schools. 48 The Census Bureau reported that
49
less than ten percent of the businesses in LaSalle Parish are black-owned.
The racial contours ofJena's population, political economy, and publicschool system reflect century-long antebellum tensions. 50 Those tensions
resurfaced in September 2006 when students and teachers at Jena High
School found three nooses in black and gold school colors hanging from the
"white tree" in the center of the campus square. 51 In the ensuing weeks,

41. This Section enlarges my earlier factual account of the incident. Alfieri, supra note 3,
at 1288-91. For useful findings on the history of race relations and white supremacy in
Louisiana, see United States v. Lousiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 362-81 (E.D. La. 1963) (declaring the
Louisiana State voter-registration "interpretation test" requirement unconstitutional).
42. Bill Quigley, Injustice in Jena as Nooses Hang from the "White Tree," TRUTHOUT, July 3,
2007, http://www.truthout.org/article/bill-quigley-injustice-jena-nooses-hang-from-white-tree.
43. Id.
44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: LOUISIANA 249
(2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dpl/2kh22.pdf.
45. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1288; see also Andrew Stephen, The Deep South, the White Tree, the
Noose, NEW STATESMAN (U.K.), Oct. 25, 2007, at 26, availableat http://www.newstatesman.com/
print/200710250028 (describing the racial atmosphere ofJena).
46. Quigley, supranote 42,
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. For a helpful mapping of these tensions, see Tamara F. Lawson, "Whites Only Tree,"
Hanging Nooses, No Crime?: Limited the Prosecutorial Veto for Hate Crimes in Louisiana and Across
America, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS (forthcoming 2009); Reginald Leamon
Robinson, The Word and the Problem of Human Unconsciousness:An Analysis of Charles R. Lawrence's
Meditation on Racism, Oppression, and Empowerment, 40 CONN. L. REv. CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 15-17
(2008), http://www.conntemplations.org/pdf/robinson.pdf.
51. State v. Bailey, 969 So. 2d 610, 610 (La. 2007); see also Chronological Order of Events
Concerningthe "JenaSix, "JENA TIMES (La.), 2007 (on file with the Iowa Law Review) [hereinafter
Chronological Order] (discussing the "white tree"); Raquel Christie, Double Whammy, AM.
JOURNALISM REv., Feb.-Mar., 2008, at 16, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4454
(same); Posting of Maria Newman to NYrimes.com: The Lede Blog, http://thelede.blogs.
nytimes.com/2007/09/20/race-and-the-spotlight-in-small-town-louisiana/?scp=1&sq=%22You%
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student interracial fighting exploded on campus summoning patrols by the
52
Jena Police Department and LaSalle Parish Sheriff Department officers,
and threats of criminal prosecution by District Attorney Walters. 53 Neither a
school-wide "lock-down" nor an on-campus search for weapons 54 prevented
the burning of a central academic building in November. 55 The Parish
56
Sheriff subsequently charged eight people, black and white, with arson.
57
Soon after, on December 1, interracial fighting spread off campus.
The next day, one or more white males beat up a black student, Robert
Bailey, at an off-campus party, 58 and a white male also pulled a shotgun on
Bailey and other black students at the Gotta-Go convenience store. 59 Two
days later, on December 4, seven black students assaulted a white student,
Justin Barker, on campus. 60 Reports suggest that Barker had ridiculed one of
the students "for having had his 'ass whipped' by a white man the previous

20know%20you%20can%20sit%20anywhere%20you%20want.%22&st=cse
11:48 AM) (same).

(Sept.

20,

2007,

The LaSalle Parish School Board dismissed the incident as a "prank" devised by three
white students. Bailey, 969 So. 2d at 611; Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1289.Jena High School ordered
a range of disciplinary sanctions including nine days of alternative school, two weeks of inschool suspension, Saturday detention, attendance in discipline court, post-suspension
evaluation, and family-wide participation in a state intervention program. Corrections,ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Oct. 12, 2007, at 2A (correcting Ken Sugiura, Jena 6, Meet Spelman 5, ATLANTA J.CONST. Oct. 8, 2007, at IB). The FBI conducted a criminal investigation but concluded that the
incident did not warrant federal charges. Newman, supra. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Western District of Louisiana reached the same conclusion. U.S. Attorney: Nooses, Beating atJena
High Not Related, CNN.COM, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/09/19/
jena.six.link/index.html; see also Caretti & O'Leary, supra note 3, at 6 (U.S. Attorney Donald
Washington "claimed the incident was not about race.").
52.

Caretti & O'Leary, supra note 3, at 14-16.

53. Id. at 4, 7-9. Black students attending the assembly perceived Walters's threats of
prosecution to be directed at them. Id. at 9; see also Bailey, 969 So. 2d at 611 (discussing the
events before and after the assembly); Robinson, supranote 50, at 18 ("Warning black students
against further unrest, Walters stated: 'I can make your lives disappear with a stroke of a pen.'"
(citation omitted)).
54.
Chronological Order, supra note 51; Chadd De Las Casas, Exposing Myths About Jena,
Louisiana, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, October 31, 2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/
article/428279/exposing-myths-about-jena-louisiana.html;
Gil Kaufman, Jena Six: What
Sparked Protesters to Descend on Small Town in Louisiana?,MTV NEWS, Se.-. 19, 2007, http://www.
mtv.com/news/articles/1570075/20070919/idO.jhtml.
55.

Caretti & O'Leary, supra note 3, at 16.

56.

Christie, supra note 51, at 16.

57.

Bailey, 969 So. 2d at 611.

58.

Id.; Caretti & O'Leary, supra note 3, at 15.

59.
Bailey, 969 So. 2d at 611; Caretti & O'Leary, supra note 3, at 15; Quigley, supra note 42;
Nicholas Persac, Legal Team Wants to Overturn Jena Verdict, DAiLY REVEILLE (Baton Rouge, La.),
Aug. 16, 2007, available at http://www.lsureveille.com/news/ 1.1176452-1.1176452.
60. Bailey, 969 So. 2d at 611. In 2008, Barker's parents filed a civil lawsuit seeking damages
from the LaSalle Parish School Board, theJena Six defendants and their parents, and a seventh
student who was never charged. Christie, supranote 51, at 16; ChronologicalOrder,supra note 51.

1664

94 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2009]

Friday night." 61 School officials later expelled Barker for transporting in his
truck a hunting rifle loaded with thirteen bullets to the high-school
campus.62Jena Police Department officers arrested Barker, releasing him on
a $5000 bond. 63
The cascade of on-campus and off-campus racial incidents atJena High
School, coupled with the subsequent arrest of the Jena Six, incited
widespread political protest involving students, parents, church ministries,
and civil-rights activists in LaSalle Parish. 64 Both black students 65 and black
parents66 joined with ministers and faith-based activists from Jena-area
churches 67 to participate in prayer meetings 68 and community-wide unity
services. 69 National black leaders also joined in local protests. 70 In March
2007, civil-rights activists mobilized to form the LaSalle Branch of the
NAACP and the Jena Six Defense Committee. 71 Additionally, in March and
July, scores of people attended "Free the Jena Six" rallies at the LaSalle

61. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1289; Stephen, supra note 45.
62. Christie, supra note 51; In La., a Missed Opportunity Ignites a Racial Uproar,USA TODAY,
Oct. 5, 2007, at 13A, availableat 2007 WLNR 19562263; Quigley, supra note 42.
63. Christie, supra note 51; Quigley, supra note 42.
64. Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1290-91; Howard Witt, Jena 6' Conviction Vacated, Chi. Trib.,
Sept. 15, 2007, at Cl.
65. Some black students stated that they initiated protests in September 2006, gathering
"in an act of solidarity" beneath the "hangman" tree on the Jena High School campus square.
ChronologicalOrder,supra note 51.
66. Black parents subsequentlyjoined with their children in attending protest rallies at the
L&A Missionary Baptist Church. Id.
67. Ministers and faith-based activists from Jena-area churches escalated protests in
December 2006 by organizing a new ministerial alliance of racial and ethnic groups across
multiple denominations. Id. at 15-16.
68. At Jena High School, more than two hundred people from all denominations and
racial groups attended a prayer meeting. Id.
69. An estimated six hundred Jena residents assembled for a community-wide prayer and
unity service sponsored by local ministries at the Guy Campbell Memorial Football Stadium. Id.
70. See Richard G. Jones, Protest in Louisiana Case Echoes the Civil Rights Era, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/us/21jena.html?-=l
("'That's not prosecutL n, that's persecution,' the Rev. Jesse Jackson, the founder of the
RainbowPUSH Coalitioi and an organizer of the demonstration, told a crowd in front of the
LaSalle Parish Courthouse. 'We will not stop marching until justice runs down like waters.'");
Newman, supra note 51 ( Today's crowd, led by several local and national civil rights leaders,
including the Rev. Al Sharpton, plans to march pastJena High School .... ").
71. In March 2007, civil-rights activists mobilized more than one hundred people at
Antioch Baptist Church near Jena to form the LaSalle Branch of the NAACP and the Jena Six
Defense Committee. ChronologicalOrder, supra note 51, at 17.
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Parish Courthouse in Jena. 72 In September 2007, twenty thousand people
73
attended a local rally in support of the Jena Six.

A.

THE PROSECUTION OF THEJENIA SIX

On December 4, 2006, LaSalle Parish Sheriff Department detectives
arrested six black students-Mychal Bell, Robert Bailey, Theodore Shaw,
Carwin Jones, Bryant Purvis, and Jesse Ray Beard, a 14-year-old juvenile-on
74
charges of aggravated second-degree battery for the assault on Barker.
LaSalle Parish DistrictJudge J.P. Mauffray set bond at $70,000 to $138,000.75
Without extrajudicial comment, District Attorney Walters amended the
parish criminal indictment, mounting elevated charges of conspiracy to
commit second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder
77
76
against the six students. The enhanced charges cited Bell as an adult,
based on his prior criminal record of violent crimes. 78 Bell's prior record
included four previous violent crimes, including two he committed while on
probation for battery. 79
At Bell's trial in June 2007, District Attorney Walters selected an allwhite jury from an all-white parish jury pool.8 0 In his opening statement,
Walters referred to the Jena Six as a "'gang of black boys"' and argued that
the tennis shoes worn by Bell during the attack should be considered a
dangerous weapon in the battery. 81 Walters called seventeen witnesseseleven white students, three white teachers, and two white nurses-to testify
at the trial.8 2 On June 28, after less than three hours of deliberation, the jury
convicted Bell of aggravated second-degree battery and conspiracy to
commit aggravated second-degree battery.83

72. Additionally, in March and May of 2007, scores of people attended rallies to support
the Jena Six at the LaSalle Parish Courthouse in Jena in collaboration with the American Civil
Liberties Union, NAACP, and the National Action Network. Christie, supra note 51, at 19.
73. Protesters traveled to Jena from throughout the nation. Peter Whoriskey, Thousands
ProtestBlacks' Treatment, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2007, at Al.
74.

State v. Bailey, 969 So. 2d 610, 611 (La. 2007); ChronologicalOrder, supra note 51, at 14.

75. Op-Ed., In La., a Missed Opportunity Ignites a Racial Uproar,USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2007, at
13A, availableat 2007 WLNR 19562263.
76. Bailey, 969 So. 2d at 611; Op-Ed., supranote 75.
77.

Jeff Kunerth, Grass-Roots Civil-Rights Cause,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 2007, at Al.

78. Reed Walters, Op-Ed., Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A27, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/opinion/26walters.html?-r- &scp=l&sq=Justice%20in
%20Jena&st-cse.
79. Christie, supra note 51.
80. Jonathan Tilove, Jena Case Grabs World's Attention: Schoolyard Fight Turns into Cause
Celebre, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 15, 2007, at 1 ("Black residents were called for the
jury pool, but none showed up.")
81.
Quigley, supra note 42.
82. Id.
83. Richard G. Jones, In Louisiana, a Tree, a Fight and a Question ofJustice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2007, at A14; Howard Witt, Outcry overJena 6 Case Rises in Congress: Top Official at the Justice
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On appeal in September 2007, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered the reversal of Bell's conviction, the vacatur of the
conspiracy charge, and the referral of the case to juvenile court for a new
trial. 84 Pursuant to these orders, after ten months in jail, Bell obtained his
release on a $45,000 bond.8 5 In December, Bell pleaded guilty to seconddegree battery in juvenile court.8 6 The plea included a sentence of eighteen
months, to be reduced by time already served in state juvenile custody, in
conjunction with a separate, partially concurrent eighteen-month sentence
for three earlier crimes.8 7 Later in December 2008, police in Monroe,
Louisiana arrested Bell for shoplifting, battery, and resisting arrest.88 Bell
89
subsequently attempted suicide.
B.

THE DET£NSE OF THEJENA Six

The defense of the Jena Six commenced with the trial of Mychal Bell.
Represented by a court-appointed black public defender, Blane Williams,
Bell publicly admitted assaulting Barker: "I hit him, you know, whatever." 90
He recalled: "I walked on, I went on about my business, whatever.... Ain't
anything else about it."9 1 He described Jena as "a real racist town," adding
that "[i] t always has been like that .... ,,92

Department Says Further Action Is Being Weighed, HOuS. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2007, at A3.
Subsequently, in July, the U.S. Attorney, Donald Washington, and the FBI announced that an
investigation of the Jena school system, police department, sheriff's department, district
attorney's office, and the 28thJudicial District Court system failed to produce evidence of civilrights violations related to racial incidents in Jena during 2006-including the noose incident.
Id.; see also Alfieri, supranote 3, at 1290. Walters "reiterated this conclusion, finding no evidence
of a federal or state offense." Id. On bias-motivated hate crimes, see FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE,
PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (2002); Frederick M. Lawrence, The
Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REv. 320
(1994). Federal and state officials steadfastly denied any link between the campus nooses, the
school arson fire, and the Barker assault. ChronologicalOrder,supra note 51; see also Alfieri, supra
note 3, at 1290.
84. State v. Bell, No. KW 07-01106, 2007 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *1-2 (La. Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2007); Alfieri, supranote 3, at 1290.
85. Associated Press, Bell Attends Court Hearing Details Under Seal, KATC.coM (Lafayette,
La.), Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://www.katc.com/global/story.asp?s=7164450&ClientType=
Printable; Teenager Released in Louisiana Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,2007, at A21.
86. Mary Foster, Racial Strife Returns to Jena on MLK Day, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah),Jan. 22, 2008, at A2.
87. Christie, supra note 51; Quigley, supra note 42.
88.

Jena 6'Figure Tried to Commit Suicide, Police Say, CNN.cOM, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.

cnn.com/2008/CRIME/12/30/jena.shooting/index.html.
89. Id.
90. Bell to CNN: Jena 'A Real Racist Town, 'TOWN TALK (Alexandria, La.), Aug. 25, 2008, at
Al.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Like many public defenders, Williams urged Bell to accept a plea
bargain on the eve of the trial, but Bell declined. 93 At trial, Williams raised
no challenge to the all-white jury pool, put on no evidence, and called no
witnesses. 94 Instead, in argument and examination, he attempted to sow
reasonable doubt regarding evidence of the assault and the reliability of
witness identification. He also excluded Bell's parents from the courtroom.
After resting his case, Williams stated: "I don't believe race is an issue in this
trial. I think I have a fair and impartial jury."9 5 He added: "I feel I put on the
best defense that I could." 96 On his rationale for calling no witnesses,
Williams remarked: "[W]hy open the door for further accusations? I did the
best I could for my client ..."97
At post-conviction proceedings in August 2007, Bell retained new
counsel consisting of a pro bono team of Monroe defense lawyers-Louis
Scott, Bob Noel, Peggy Sullivan, and Lee Perkins. 98 The defense team
challenged Bell's trial as "unfair" and sought to overturn his conviction by
vacating the sentence, transferring the case to juvenile court, and convening
a new trial. 99 Strategically employing race-coded rhetoric, the team linked
race to emotion and emotion to unfairness. Pointing to the "emotion"
inflaming La Salle Parish, Bob Noel declared: "[Bell] did not get a fair
trial." 100 Amplifying the rhetoric of racially inflammatory emotion, Noel
commented: "The case should not be tried in La Salle parish.... It's obvious
that there isn't anybody in the parish that doesn't have opinions of the case
one way or the other. That certainly will effect [sic] anyone's ability to get a
fair trial." 10 1 Likewise, adverting to racially disparate treatment and the
jurisdictional and sentencing errors that ensued, Louis Scott observed: "The
worst thing that happened from a procedural standpoint [is] normally a
102
In
person under similar circumstances would be in juvenile court."
to
the
sentencing
for
impossible
addition, Scott said: "I feel it's pretty much

93.

Howard Witt, Louisiana Teen Guilty in School Beating Case, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2007, at

C7.
94. On defendant's recusal motion, see State v.Bailey, 969 So. 2d 610 (La. 2007).
95. Bill Quigley, Racial Discriminationand the Legal System: The Recent Lessons of Louisiana,
UN CHRON., Nov. 3, 2007, at 56, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml309/
7
4
is_3_44/ai-n2421 35 /.
96. Quigley, supra note 42.
97. Id.; accord Associated Press, Black Teen Convicted in Beating of White Student,
MSNBC.coM, June 28, 2007, http://www.msnbc.com/id/19488285 (last visited March 30,

2009); Witt, supranote 93, at C7.
98. Sana Saleh, PivotalHearingfor Mychal Bell, Set Sept 4, INDYMEDIA, Aug. 18, 2007, http://
indymedia.us/en/2007/08/26993.shtml.
99. Id.
100. Persac, supra note 59.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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be just. If a person is wrongfully convicted, it's impossible for them to have a
10 3

fair sentencing."
Despite their rhetorical and tactical differences, both Bell's courtappointed public defender and his post-conviction pro bono team deployed
traditional race-based defense strategies. In pretrial and trial proceedings,
the public defender carried out a colorblind, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
strategy of race neutrality, seeking an acquittal on evidentiary grounds. On
appeal, the pro bono team marshaled a color-coded, harmful-error strategy,
obliquely citing race-infected passions and disparate treatment in order to
overturn the jury verdict, vacate the court's sentence, and obtain a new trial
in juvenile court. To better understand the racial substance of these
competing defense strategies and the overlooked relevance of the
antebellum defense, consider the standard conception of criminal-defense
ethics.
III. THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF CRIMINAL-DEFENSE ETHICS
The standard conception of criminal-defense ethics permitted use of
the antebellum defense by both the public defender and the pro bono team
in the Jena Six case. Emblematic of the professional morality of lawyers, the
standard conception distinguishes between the morality of the client's cause
and the morality of the representation. Indeed, as Luban states, "the lawyer's
morality is distinct from, and not implicated in, the client's."' 10 4 For Luban,
two principles rationalize this partitioned conception of the lawyer's
morality and role: the principle of nonaccountability and the principle of
professionalism. The principle of nonaccountability or neutrality posits that
a lawyer, when advocating for a client, "is neither legally, professionally, nor
morally accountable for the means used or the ends achieved." 10 5 At the
same time, the principle of professionalism or partisanship holds that a
lawyer, when advocating for a client, "must, within the established
constraints upon professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the
106
client will prevail."
To Luban, William
Simon, and
others, the principles of
nonaccountability and professionalism give rise to a claim of neutral
partisanship in legal ethics. 107 From a functional or regulatory stance, Luban

103.

Id.

104.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 20.

105. Id. (quoting Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL.
L. REV. 669,673 (1978)).

106.

Id.

107.

See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'

ETHICS 2 (1998) ("[T]he dominant conception of the lawyer's professional responsibilities
weakens the connection between the practical tasks of lawyering and the values ofjustice that
lawyers believe provide the moral foundations of their role."); William H. Simon, The Ideology of
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concedes, the principle of professionalism or partisanship may be true.
Nonetheless, he insists, the principle of nonaccountability or neutrality is
not. He adds, to the extent that a lawyer's nonaccountability depends on the
adversary system, that reliance is misplaced. Exposing the fallacy of
nonaccountability and the failed bulwark of the adversary system enables
Luban to defend the morality of conscience against the claim that the
professional obligation derived from the adversary system can override it. 108
Yet, for the Jena Six and other young black male lawbreakers, the morality of
conscience fails to withstand the overriding adversary obligation to assert the
antebellum defense when strategically compelled by the circumstances of
the criminaljustice system. The next Section assembles Luban's critique of
the adversary system and its professional obligations.
A.

THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

Luban's analysis of the adversary system incorporates both adversary
principles and contexts. His starting point is Lord Henry Brougham's axiom
of partisan advocacy. Brougham states: "An advocate, in the discharge of his
duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client." 10 9
Cabined by this vision, Brougham's prototypical advocate defines his dutya duty generalizable to all clients and universal in application-narrowly. On
behalf of this universal ideal, Brougham opines:
To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards
and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his
first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others.110
For Luban, moral theory rejects the narrow claim that an advocate
knows only his client and, equally, the institutional claim that an advocate's
adversary role relaxes ordinary moral obligations while imposing new
overriding professional obligations. Luban's rejection of such claims stems
from the weak institutional justifications for the adversary system-a
weakness that dilutes the force of corresponding institutional excuses.111 In
the criminal-justice system, as in the case of the Jena Six, institutional
justifications and excuses hinge on adversary principles.

Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-37 (discussing the

principles of neutrality and partisanship).
108. LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 19-21.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id.
111. Luban asks: "Can a person appeal to a social institution in which he or she occupies a
role in order to excuse conduct that would be morally culpable were anyone else to do it?" Id. at
23.
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1. Adversary Principles
Adversary principles underlie the antebellum defense and its ideal of
"zealous advocacy." Luban finds this ideal entrenched in the text of the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct. He
points, for example, to the express rule enjoining lawyers to "act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf." 112 This injunction directs a lawyer to
"take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a
client's cause or endeavor." 113 Vindication, he notes, requires the zealous
advocate "to press the client's interests to the limit of the legal"-that is, to
the boundaries of both "lawful and ethical" conduct-regardless of others'
interests. 114 That limit, he laments, fails to mitigate zealous advocacy.
The interpretive traditions governing law and ethics contribute to this
boundary failure. Lawyers, Luban explains, measure the limits of "ethical"
conduct against the yardstick of formal ethics rules, not against independent
moral principles. 115 Moreover, lawyers gauge the limits of "lawful" conduct
against the "double-edged" standard of legal rules that simultaneously bind
and unshackle zealous advocacy. 116 This ever-shifting standard allows lawyers
to push morally dubious claims to the law's limit and, sometimes more
aggressively, to the law's "colorable" margin. 117 Consequently, for Luban, the
"limits of the law inevitably lie beyond moral limits, and zealous advocacy
always means zeal at the margin." 118 Legal advocacy's unbounded quality
casts the lawyer in the adversarial role of a partisan and fashions a duty of
one-sided zeal free of moral compunctions. 119 Partisan zeal defines the
antebellum defense-its scope and quality-in the adversary context of the
criminal-justice system.

112.

MODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 1.3cmt. 1 (2009).

113.

Id.

114.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 24.

115.

Id. at 24. The Model Rules declare that a lawyer's representation of the client "does

not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2009).
116. See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 25 (explaining that "doubleedgedness is an essential feature of any law because any restraint imposed on human behavior
in the name ofjust social policy may be used to restrain behavior when circumstances make this
an unjust outcome").
117. Id. at 26 ("'Zeal' means zeal at the margin of the legal, and thus well past the margin
of whatever moral and political insight constitutes the 'spirit' of the law in question."); see David
B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 469 (1990)

(arguing that "the

traditional model of legal ethics is premised on formalistic assumptions about the constraining
power of legal rules").
118. LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 26.
119. Id. at 23-28.
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Adversary Contexts

Adversary contexts further bolster the antebellum defense. Luban
considers both criminal and noncriminal adversary contexts. In the criminal
and quasi-criminal 120 contexts of the Jena Six, for example, where state
prosecutions and school disciplinary proceedings intersect, Luban invites us
to treat zealous defense advocacy as a "special case" serving "atypical social
goals." 121 Borrowing from political theory, he links the goal of zealous
advocacy in criminal defense to curtailing the power of the state to
prosecute and to punish its citizens. Instead of cultivating justice, this goal
advances the "political ends" of "keeping the state honest" and "keeping the
government's hands off people." 122 Echoing Monroe Freedman and
others, 123 Luban acknowledges that the imperative of zealous advocacy
survives in criminal-defense practice as an "exceptional means" of protecting
individual liberty against state encroachment. 124 In that specific context, he
emphasizes, "the protection of accused individuals against state
overreaching is just as central a goal as attaining legal justice." 125 Protection,
here furnished by the antebellum defense, aims to check prosecutorial
overreaching and to curb state punitive power. 126 Against this political
horizon, the justifications for the adversary system flow out of the criminal
120.
Luban explains the inclusion of quasi-criminal contexts as the "progressive correction
to classical liberalism." Id. at 31 n.36 (citing id. at 58--66).
121.

Id. at30.

122.

Id.

123.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (3d ed.
2004); Monroe H. Freedman, An EthicalManifesto for PublicDefenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 911,920
(2005) ("In order to allow zealous investigation and research, defense counsel is forbidden to
carry a workload that interferes with this minimum standard of competence, . . . or one that
might lead to the breach of other professional obligations." (citation omitted)); John B.
Mitchell, The Ethics of the CriminalDefense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv.
293, 321-27 (1980) ("I defend the guilty not simply to protect all of us but also to protect the
guilty from the corrupting influences of the criminal justice system."); Abbe Smith, Defending
Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 925, 927-30 (2000) (discussing a defense attorney's challenge in a high-profile policebrutality case); Abbe Smith, The Difference in CriminalDefense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL'Y 83, 84-87 (2003) (exploring the differences between criminal and civil cases);
Harry I. Subin, The CriminalLawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the "Right" to Presenta False
Case, 1 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 147-49 (1987) (considering whether it is necessary to present
a false case in order to preserve individual autonomy against the state).
124.
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 29. CompareDavid Luban, Are Criminal
Defenders Dfferent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1749-52 (1993) (exempting criminal defense from
certain ethical standards), with William H. Simon, The Ethics of CriminalDefense, 91 MICH. L. REv.
1703, 1703 (1993) (criticizing a criminal-defense exception), William H. Simon, Reply: Further
Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1767, 1767 (1993) (same), and
Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (contending that lawyers who stray from standards of professional
responsibility violate morality).
125.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 31.

126.

Id. at 28-31.
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and quasi-criminal (school discipline) contexts of the Jena Six, seemingly
unchecked by the morality of conscience and the normative commitment to
identity.
B.

JUSTICATIONS FOR THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

Notwithstanding Luban's moral reservations, the antebellum defense
garners force from proffered justifications of the adversary system built on
consequentialist, pragmatic, and nonconsequentialist grounds. Luban
searches these varied adversary justifications in the criminal context to
appraise their impact on legal justice. Consequentialist justifications assess
the adversary system as a means to accomplish specific goals.
Nonconsequentialist justifications look to the adversary system as
intrinsically good. Pragmatic justifications evaluate the adversary system in
accordance with a more elaborate version of the tradition argument based
on the efficacy, expedience, and the continuity of social institutions. First,
we turn to consequentialistjustifications.
1.

ConsequentialistJustifications

Luban surveys consequentialist justifications championing the adversary
system as the best means of promoting truth, defending individual legal
rights, and safeguarding against the excesses of zealous advocacy. For
Luban, the consequentialist claim of adversarial fact-finding and truth
promotion rests on non-empirical premises 127 and the ambiguous results of
laboratory-simulated social-psychology experiments designed to model
adversary and inquisitorial systems. These epistemic shortcomings, he points
out, are exacerbated by adversarial roles and ethics rules that permit or
require behavior designed to obfuscate the truth and to thwart
28
transparency. 1
Similar shortcomings hamper the consequentialist claim that the
adversary system offers the best way of defending individuals' legal rights.
The "best defense" claim of adversary advocacy, according to Luban, reasons
that a "no-holds-barred zealous advocate tries to get everything the law can
give (if that is the client's wish) and thereby does a better job of defending
the client's legal rights than a less committed lawyer would do." 129 On this

127. See Charles M. Sevilla, CriminalDefense Lawyers and the Search for Truth, 20 HARV.J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 519, 523-28 (1997) (describing six myths the public believes about the criminaljustice system).
128. LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 31-40. Distinguishing disclosures of
fact and law, Luban mentions that ethics rules require lawyers "to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." This rule, he observes, promotes
transparency in the adjudication of questions of law. Id. at 36-37 (quoting MODEL RULEs OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (a) (2) (2004)).
129. Id. at 42.
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logic, the day-to-day clash of adversaries "most effectively" defends legal
rights. 130 But, for Luban, no empirical proof explicates "why an adversary
system is the best defender of legal rights." 131 Lacking evidence of functional
superiority, Luban concedes only "that under the adversary system an
exemplary lawyer is required to indulge in overkill to obtain as legal rights
benefits that in fact may not be legal rights." 13 2 Rights expansion, or perhaps
degradation, of this sort comes from the result-oriented, institutional-role
morality of advocacy.
The risk of overzealous role behavior cited by Luban and others
weakens the consequentialist claim that the ethical division of labor within
the social institutions of the adversary system mitigates the excesses of
advocacy. Luban explains that, in the public sphere, moral constraints apply
differentially to the actions and offices of complex bureaucratic institutions,
such as prosecutor and public-defender offices, giving rise to ethical
divisions of labor and specialization. To an extent, ethical specialization
operates within, and gains some legitimacy from, larger existing institutional
structures governed by social roles tailored to "counteract" or check the
excesses of role-behavior. 133 ABA ethics rules countenance these social roles
and institutional structures in the context of law-firm regulation, specifically
134
enumerating the responsibilities of supervisory and subordinate lawyers.
To Luban, however, socially engineered systems of institutional checks and
balances designed to counter zealous advocacy fail because the adversary
advocate deliberately works to evade the constraints of such systems. Within
legal education and professional training, in fact, calculated evasion
constitutes a core advocacy skill. Additionally, he remarks, the systems fail
13 5
because they lack "self-correcting" or cost-efficient rectifying mechanisms.
Even when transaction costs allow rectification, the division of role-specific
institutional authority and function encourages the continuous abdication
of moral responsibility in the contest of adversary advocacy.
Nonconsequentialistjustifications fare no better.
2.

NonconsequentialistJustifications

Luban considers nonconsequentialist justifications of the adversary
system based on claims of intrinsic good and tradition. The first of these
justifications links the adversary system to the conventional lawyer-client
relation, for example the instant defender-offender relationship between
130.

Id.

131.
132.

Id. at 43.
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 43.

133.

Id. at 44-45.

134.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 5.1 (2009) (creating separate responsibilities

for supervisory lawyers and for subordinate lawyers); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2
(same).
135. LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 44-47.
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the public defender Blane Williams and his client Mychal Bell, endorsing
that relation as "an intrinsic moral good."1 36 The second connects adversary
adjudication to tradition, presumably the dominant tradition, and the
37
overall fabric of society defined by the majority culture. 1
Framed by the lawyer-client relation, the intrinsic-good argument
asserts the positive moral value of an advocate serving the "man-in-trouble"
in the role of a "special-purpose friend." 138 To Luban, neither the moral
worth of the lawyer-client relation nor the morally praiseworthy care of
clients, in conjunction with or at the expense of other third persons, justifies
the adversary system. Predicated on an ethic of care and a veil ofjust law, the
friendship analogy, Luban shows, not only "undercuts" the principle of
nonaccountability but also discounts the impact of the adversary system on
the lawyer-client relationship and the responsibility of the lawyer as "the
agent of morally-bad-but-legally-legitimate outcomes." 139 Diminishing the
creative hand of the lawyer in advocacy, the adversary system, and the acts of
lawyer agency in the conduct of representation, Luban concludes, lessens
140
lawyer moral responsibility for adversary behavior.
The social-fabric argument, in contrast, maintains that the adversary
system serves as an integral part of contemporary culture ratified by popular
consent and enshrined in tradition. 141 Although acknowledging the roots of
social-fabric claims in democratic and social-contract theory, Luban disputes
the quality and moral force of purported tacit consent to the adversary
system. He points to the lack of any showing that the institutions of the
adversary system either promote a "positive moral good" or embody the
"general will" of society.142 Similarly, in discarding an alternative claim of
adversarial tradition as a moral obligation, he cites the lack of a stable
adversary tradition in the common law and the deviation from partisan
norms in ethics rules, for example in the requirements of meritorious
claims, candor, and fairness. 143 To Luban, the adversary system is an
144
ancillary institution marginal to, and unincorporated in, tradition.
Pragmatic justifications falter in the same way.

136.

Id. at 47.

137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 48, 50-51.

140.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 48, 50-51.

141. Id. at 51 ("According to the social fabric argument, the moral reason for staying with
our institutions is precisely that they are ours.").
142. Id. at 51-55.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
143.
3.3; MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4.
144.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 51-55.
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Pragmatic Justifications

As a more elaborate version of the tradition argument, pragmatic
justifications of the adversary system rest on the efficacy, the expedience,
and the continuity of social institutions. To Luban, efficacy suggests that the
adversary system does "as good a job as any at finding truth and protecting
legal rights" and the costs of replacing it outweigh the benefits. 145 For the
purposes of dispute resolution, expedience warrants the necessity of an
adjudicatory system of some kind. Continuity backs preservation of the status
quo.
Luban disparages both the logical weakness and conservative
conclusion of these pragmatic propositions, noting their failure to show that
the adversary system as a social institution is "better" than its rivals or even
"particularly good." 146 More importantly, he bemoans the effect of
pragmatic argument on the moral obligations of lawyers as institutional
functionaries, even as he seems to accept that public defenders may
appropriately engage in race-coded strategies. Luban contends that a social
institution that endures without evidence that it serves a "positive moral
good"-and hence receives only a pragmatic justification-is incapable of
providing institutional excuses for immoral acts. 147 This contention
48
challenges what he calls the "transitivity" argument. 1
Luban distills the "transitivity" argument and its pragmatic justification
of the adversary system into three steps. The first step presumes that the
social institution of the adversary system stands 'justified." 149 The second
step asserts that the institution of the adversary system "requires its
functionary to do A. " 150 The third step summarily concludes that "the
functionary is justified in doing A."' 151 Luban denies that this conclusion
follows from such premises. For Luban, the predicate institutional obligation
in the first step posits only a prima facie obligation. On this analysis, the
weaker the presumed justification of the institution, the weaker the force of
the institutional obligation in overriding other morally relevant factors.
Thus, he contends, "the presumption that lawyers must fulfill their roleobligations may be overcome by sufficiently weighty values on the other
side." 152 For the Jena Six, their families, and the historically interconnected
black communities of LaSalle Parish, those "weighty values" are bound up in
racial identity and dignity.

145.

Id. at56.

146.
147.
148.

Id. at57.
Id.
Id.

149.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 57.

150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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Absent the counterweight of overriding values and associated moral
obligations, Luban cautions, the transitivity argument approves lawyers
engaging in "ruthless, rights-violating activity" without "moral regret at their
actions." 153 For young black male lawbreakers, their families, and local
communities, the antebellum defense and its race-coded counterparts
threaten ruthless, dignitary rights-violating activity by defenders in the form
of racial humiliation inflicted at times with moral regret and at times without
any. Regret, Luban notes, aids the development of moral character and
good judgment in "dirty hands" situations where legal agents-here
prosecutors
and defenders-confront
difficult institutional
role
obligations. 154 Insofar as the race-coded defense of the Jena Six and other
young black male lawbreakers constitutes a "dirty hands" situation, Luban
complains that the loss of moral regret renders lawyers "unable to draw
adequate lines in any sort of situation that requires normative judgment," a
moral impairment "inconsistent with what it takes to practice law at all." 155
That result-described by Luban as a kind of super "adversariality"artificially exempts institutional agents, again like prosecutors and
defenders, from ordinary moral requirements that conflict with their roleobligations. 156
Luban condemns this inertial result and its celebration of conformity
and tradition. Aimed at the ideology of the adversary system, his central
criticism focuses on the institutional excuses professing to free lawyers from
ordinary moral obligations in situations of conflicting professional
obligations. Yet, his criticism spares adversarial ruthlessness in criminaldefense cases when, as here, the adversary system offers a compelling
institutional excuse, thus implicitly exempting public-defender institutions
and agents from ordinary moral obligations toward racial identity and
dignity. 157 In such cases, Luban maintains, zealous advocacy is not immoral,
even when it frustrates the adversary search for truth or violates individual
legal rights. 158 This limited vindication of the adversary system and the
mandated duties of partisan advocacy, Luban admits, presumptively favors
institutional role-obligation under the principle of professionalism rather
than the principle of nonaccountability, unless another "serious and
153.

Id.

154.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 35, at 61.

155.

Id.

156. See id. at 57-62 (discussing institutional excuses).
157. Luban remarks that in noncriminal contexts, where the institutional excuse based on
liberal fear of the state is unavailable, the adversary system possesses only slight moral force, and
thus can excuse only slight moral wrongs. On this analysis, the lawyer's role carries no moral
privileges and immunities above the nonlawyer's role. Id. at 57-62; see also id. at 63 ("Anything
else that is morally wrong for a nonlawyer to do on behalf of another person is morally wrong
for a lawyer to do as well.").
158. Id. at 63 ("Sometimes frustrating the search for truth may be a morally worthy thing to
do, and sometimes moral rights are ill served by legal rights.").
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countervailing moral obligation" rebuts that professional obligation. 159 Put
more forcefully, for Luban, when serious moral obligation conflicts with
professional obligation, moral obligation compels lawyer civil disobedience
via abrogation of professional rules. 160 For defenders of the Jena Six and
other young black male lawbreakers, however, this powerful endorsement of
rule civil disobedience fails to resolve the threshold question of whether the
normative values of racial identity and dignity give rise to a serious and
countervailing lawyer moral obligation of client non-humiliation sufficient
to rebut the professional obligation and political goal of zealous advocacy in
the criminal-justice system. For guidance in reconciling the pull of moral
and professional obligations in criminal cases, we turn next to an alternative
dignitary conception of criminal-defense ethics gleaned from Luban's work.
IV. A DIGNITARY CONCEPTION OF CRIMINAL-DEFENSE ETHICS
Luban formulates an alternative dignitary conception of criminaldefense ethics out of two working hypotheses. Both relate to the practice of
law and the adversary system. The first asserts that upholding human dignity
makes the practice of law "worthwhile." 16 1 The second rebukes adversarial
excesses as wrong when they "assault" human dignity. 162 To Luban, the
concept of human dignity derives from theological articles of faith that defy
rational proof or metaphysical reconstruction. Hence, he argues, secular
efforts to designate human dignity as a metaphysical property of individual
autonomy are "wrongheaded." 163 Instead, Luban defines dignity as a way of
being human. On this definition, human dignity accrues as a property of
relationships between individuals, relationships structured by daily
interaction between the dignifier and the dignified. 164 That common sense
or naturalized account of dignity extends to the relationships between
lawyers and clients, connecting lawyers and the construction of clients' legal
personalities and legal rights to the defense of human dignity. Lawyers, he
remarks, construct and demolish a client's legal personality and legal rights
through story. 165
A.

DIGNITY, STORY, AND VOICE

Luban links client dignity, story, and voice to the lawyers' role in
courtroom advocacy. For Luban, human dignity requires clients to be heard.
The courtroom provides a forum for clients "to tell their stories and argue

35, at 63.
Id. at 62-63 ("When they don't conflict, professional obligations rule the day.").
LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 23, at 66.
Id. at66.

159.
160.
161.
162.

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supranote
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164.

Id.
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Id. at 65-68.
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their understandings of the law." 166 Access to counsel, he notes, ensures the
telling of client stories, but it does not assure the integrity or fullness of
67
story. 1 Luban concedes that counsel's advocacy efforts may encroach upon
and distort client stories. 168 Well-intentioned lawyer embellishment of a
client's story in advocacy, he forewarns, may produce a "fictionalized version
of the client's story." 169 That interpretive tendency places limits on advocacy
as an instrument for the expression of client voice and story, including
identity-based voice and story describing the multifaceted experience of race
in law, culture, and society.
For Luban, good faith tempers the encroachments of advocacy. "No
matter how untrustworthy somebody may have proved to be in the past," he
explains, "one fails to respect his or her dignity as a human being if on any
serious matter one refuses even provisionally to treat his or her testimony
about it as being in good faith." 170 Doubtless, that good-faith commandment
extends to matters of identity-racial or otherwise. Integral to human
dignity, identity--class, gender, race, and more-shapes the subjective
experience of personhood intuitively and cognitively. Respecting a client's
human dignity under Luban's relational principle of good-faith treatment
requires lawyers to suspend disbelief and to hear the story the client puts
forth without legal or strategic embellishment. Luban's notion of good faith
emphasizes the first-personal, subjective character of client story. Chiefly,
human dignity means having a story of one's own. A client's story, he notes,
"is not just the story in which she figures; it is the story she has to tell." 171 In
this sense, the client is both the subject matter and the center of her story.
Luban locates individual subjectivity at the core of human dignity.
Advocacy that denies a client's subjectivity-what Luban calls the
"ontological heft" of a human being-also denies her human dignity. 172
That denial denigrates a client's status as a subject in the world and amounts
to a form of humiliation that violates human dignity. Humiliation treats a
client's subjectivity and her point of view as "totally insignificant."' 7 3 For
example, ignoring or excluding a client's story in advocacy, as in the case of
Mychal Bell, presumes that some clients have no point of view worth hearing
or expressing. 174

166.

LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supranote 23, at 68.

167.
168.
169.

Id. at69.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 69.

170.

Id. at 68 (quoting Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practicein the Adversary System, in THE

GOOD LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 130 (David Luban ed., 1984)).
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LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 23, at 70.

Id. at71.
Id.
Id. at 71-72.
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Luban's notion of subjectivity instructs lawyers to honor a client's
human dignity. To do so, a lawyer must hear the story a client wishes to tell.
Honoring or respecting dignity occurs in the context of the lawyer-client
relationship, a relationship between the dignifier and the dignified.
Relational respect of this kind affords a common-sense account of human
dignity tied to story. Lawyers advance human dignity by giving the client a
voice in telling her story and sparing her the humiliation of being ignored,
excluded, or silenced. 175 Like its race-coded cohorts, the antebellum
defense not only ignores, excludes, and silences the powerful historical voice
and story of racial identity, but it also humiliates the dignity and subjectivity
of those willing and able to speak of their identity as an intrinsic normative
value.
Yet, Luban points out, criminal defenders often construct a story in
advocacy that has little or nothing to do with the client's voice or story in
reality. 176 This divergence, he explains, inheres in the basic function of
criminal-defense advocacy. 177 Skilled defenders, he continues, "construct
and promote theories of the case consistent with the evidence even if the
theories have nothing to do with reality." 1 78 To Luban, this case-theory
function honors a defendant's human dignity by presuming that she has a
"good-faith story to tell" and by crediting her claim of innocence. 179 Both
presumptions, he insists, operate to avoid not only erroneous criminal
conviction, but also the mistaken moral condemnation and concomitant
"loss of stature" that comes with it. 180 Together with the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, the twin presumptions of the criminal-defense
function permit the construction of a good-faith story of innocence from the
adduced evidence, even if the story proves untrue. To do otherwise, Luban
warns, would violate the human dignity of the defendant.
In this way, Luban's account of criminal-defense ethics postulates a
complex dual role for criminal defenders rooted in human dignity. That
duality contemplates direct and indirect approaches to safeguarding dignity.
For the Jena Six defenders, the role permits direct efforts to safeguard the
defendants' dignity by telling their individual stories as well as indirect
efforts to preserve their dignity by demonstrating that for each a good-faith
story of innocence may be adduced from the evidence.181 Reluctant to tell
Bell's story directly, given his public confession of lawbreaking and blunt
accusation of historical racism across LaSalle Parish, the Jena public
defender opted for a good-faith story of innocence tailored to a traditional
175.

Id. at 72-73.
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"beyond a reasonable doubt" defense strategy. Authorized by ABA ethics
rules regulating the criminal-defense function, this strategy allows a lawyer
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding to "so defend the proceeding as
to require that every element of the case be established."1 82 That regulatory
allowance springs from federal and state constitutional law that "entitles a
defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a
claim or contention" in opposition to prosecutorial charges. 183 Bell's public
defender fairly relied on these constitutional and ethical sources in erecting
his "beyond a reasonable doubt" defense strategy. Fair or not, that reliance
risks charges of paternalism. To grasp these charges, consider paternalism in
terms of dignity, self-humiliation, and non-humiliation.
1. Paternalism
In exploring the dual role of defenders in the criminal-justice system,
Luban connects the direct and indirect defense of offender dignity to the
issue of lawyers' paternalism toward clients. Luban uses the term paternalism
generally to describe interference with another person's liberty for her own
supposed good. 184 Extended here, he uses the term more specifically to
describe a lawyer's refusal to abide by a client's wishes because of anticipated
harm to the client. 185 Paternalism of both sorts, he argues, silences the
client's story and voice, and therefore dishonors her dignity as a human
86
being and as a story-bearer. 1
Silencing story-bearing clients offends human dignity and impacts
autonomy. Luban rejects the automatic identification of human dignity with
autonomy. To Luban, autonomy focuses too narrowly on the human faculty
of free will and equates human dignity too closely with willing and
choosing.1 87 These focal points of agency, Luban believes, present "a
truncated view of humanity and human experience." 188 Honoring a person's
"human dignity," he maintains, means "honoring" her "being," a state or
status that "transcends" simple choices. 189 Broadly conceived by Luban,
being encompasses the way people "experience the world," including their
perceptions, passions, sufferings, relationships, cares, and commitments. 190
Lawyers honor human dignity, he adds, when they take seriously client cares
and commitments in advocacy. They dishonor dignity when they "ride

182.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009).

183. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 3 (2009).
184. LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 23, at 74.
185. Id.
186. Id. On paternalism, see generally David Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, 1981
Wis. L. REV.454.
187. LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 23, at 76.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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roughshod over the commitments that make the client's life meaningful and
191
so impart dignity to it."
To support this proposition, Luban cites the high-profile criminal case
of Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, and his resistance to his federalpublic-defender team's "mental defense" strategy. 192 Kaczynski's public
defenders, he notes, proffered a psychiatric defense despite their client's
"comprehensible and respectable" objections, 193 effectively disregarding
Kaczynski's intellectual commitments to domestic terrorism. Overriding
Kaczynski's commitments and ignoring his wishes in criminal-defense
advocacy, Luban remarks, humiliated him and "demolished" his human
dignity. 194 For Luban, that human indignity constituted a moral wrong
independent of, and more pernicious than, the public-defender team's
deprivation of Kaczynski's choice of defense. 195 For Mychal Bell and the
Jena Six, by contrast, the experience of humiliation and indignity was less
stark and the moral wrong of representation was less pronounced. Instead of
a direct clash over defense strategy and value commitment, Bell and his
defense teams differed over racial candor and consciousness. Both at trial
and on appeal, the teams opted for colorblind and race-coded defense
strategies while Bell elected anti-racist candor. However paternalistic,
neither colorblind nor race-coded defense strategies call for the explicit
client self-humiliation dictated by the antebellum defense.
2.

Self-Humiliation

Paternalism-imposed indignity implies a second form of humiliation
relevant to defenders and their clients: self-humiliation. Luban links client
self-humiliation

to

compelled

self-incrimination. 196

Compulsory

self-

incrimination, he explains, is a form of deliberate humiliation that enlists an
offender's "own will" in the process of punishment, effectively "splitting" the
client "against herself."197 The notion of splitting or dividing the self, he
remarks, contravenes the federal constitutional text of the SelfIncrimination Clause. Inscribed in the Fifth Amendment, the clause states
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." 198
To be a witness against oneself, Luban argues, is to adopt a disinterested
outsider's stance toward one's own condemnation. In his view, that adoption
degrades individual subjectivity and signals "an extraordinary kind of self191.

Id.
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alienation." 199 The inner split and the self-alienation produced by
compelling an offender to be a witness against herself in turn generates
humiliation. The humiliation of enlisting the offender's will in the process
of his own moral condemnation, Luban contends, violates the SelfIncrimination Clause and human dignity itself. 200 More than other racecoded defenses, such as "rotten social background," the antebellum defense
dictates an offender's own moral self-condemnation on the grounds of
innate criminal character and natural criminal pathology. Unlike the
pretense of colorblind defenses or the rhetoric of race-coded defenses, the
self-condemnation of the antebellum defense damages both the dignity and
subjective will of offender clients.
3.

Non-Humiliation

The self-humiliation strand of paternalism in the lawyer-client
relationship reinforces the importance of subjectivity and integrity to the
preservation of human dignity. For Luban, dignity situates the client as the
subject of her own story. Subject-centered storytelling requires a lawyer's
good faith, alert listening, and narrative integrity. Integrity-based narratives
frame the client as the subject of experience located within a web of
cultural, political, and social commitments. The commitments connect the
individual self to larger communities-family, church, school, and
neighborhood. Honoring human dignity, Luban stresses, means refraining
from overriding those commitments and humiliating people for
paternalistic reasons.201
Positing the intuitive connection between human dignity and nonhumiliation, Luban proposes a non-humiliation theorem of human dignity.
This theorem treats dignity as a status-concept ranked by "the prestige
conferred simply by being human." 20 2 Indignity and humiliation occur,
Luban reasons, when a person is treated as "lesser" than or below her "rank,"
for example, as "property," as an "object," or as a "subhuman"marked by
innate or natural inferiority. 20 3 That diminution of stature amounts to a loss
of dignity and humiliation.

199.
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Luban casts lawyers as defenders of human dignity. This role facilitates
the telling of a client's subjective stories and the expression of her
interwoven commitments. Upholding human dignity, specifically the notion
of dignity as non-humiliation, for Luban involves lawyers in a "shared
enterprise" with clients that reduces their dependency and maintains their
self-respect. 20 5 The antebellum defense accomplishes neither of these
objectives, instead focusing on telling stories of inferiority, depicting
dependence, and demeaning identity. Luban's vision, by comparison,
consonant with his commitment to human dignity, treats clients as rightsbearers and links the advocacy enterprise to the promotion of clients' selfsufficiency. A rights-bearer, Luban notes, is "a legal person, with ontological
heft that others are obligated to respect." 20 6 Respecting the rights and
dignity of criminal offenders enmeshes lawyers and clients in a moral
conversation and relationship. Both identity and community are crucial to
that interaction.
B.

IDENTTY, DIGNITY, AND COMMUNITY

Luban's non-humiliation theorem of human dignity, and its core
notions of subjectivity, story, and voice, coincides with a race-consciousoutsider conception of criminal-defense ethics. Coincidence hinges on the
lynchpins of identity and community. Both identity and community shape
the experience of individual subjectivity. The multiple categories of
identity---class, gender, race, and sexuality-influence the tone of a person's
voice and the content of her story. Similarly, the varied configurations of
community-family, church, school, and neighborhood-forge the personal
commitments and relationships expressed in voice and story. Without the
meaning-giving substance of identity and community, and their cognitive
and interpretive frameworks, the expression of subjectivity through voice
and story fails to represent fully the perceptions, passions, sufferings,
relationships, cares, and commitments of the self. Under-representation of
the self in voice and story excludes parts of human experience that give
form to individual subjectivity in context. Exclusion, and the silence that
ensues, risks humiliation and indignity. The exclusion of the antebellum
defense in discarding the core perceptions, passions, sufferings,
relationships, cares, and commitments of the racial self apart from claims of
innate criminal character and pathology, for example, silences individual
and collective histories of racial independence, self-respect, and power.
A race-conscious-outsider conception links subjectivity, identity, and
community to the experience of racial dignity and humiliation in the
criminal-justice system. Applied to the defense of the Jena Six, that

205. Id. ("Everyone is a subject, everyone's story is as meaningful to her or to him as
everyone else's, and everyone's deep commitments are central to their personality.").
206. Id. at 94.

1684

94 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[20091

conception repudiates colorblind neutrality, reintegrates law and politics,
and recognizes the possibility of empowering the legal personality and legal
rights of black offenders in criminal law and procedure. 2 7 Luban's theorem
encourages these race-conscious shifts and the recasting of the criminaljustice system as a dignity-affirming institution and the defender role as a
dignity-restoring relation. Recasting the "moral properties" 2 8 of defender
relationships and institutions recognizes "offenders and offender
communities as identity-bearing moral agents," and calls for a "moral
relation" between individual defenders and offender communities. 20 9 That
relationship reconceives the "role-specific duties" of defenders by instilling
the "moral obligation" to value identity-based differences and
commitments. 210 Fused with a race-conscious vision, Luban's theorem
reveals three historically overlooked categories of moral relationships within
the criminal-justice system: identity-affirming relations between defenders
and offenders, dignity-restoring relations between defenders and offenders
in cooperation with offender interest groups such as families and faith-based
groups, and community-empowering relations between defenders and
offender communities.
1.

Identity-Affirming Relations

Luban's non-humiliation theorem of human dignity applies to wide
fields of civil- and criminal-justice advocacy, here to encourage identityaffirming relations between defenders and offenders in the defense of Bell
and the Jena Six. In revisiting District Attorney Walters's prosecutorial
decisions-specifically "to charge Bell with conspiracy and attempted
second-degree murder, to demand his trial as an adult, and to reject
rehabilitative sentencing"-the theorem construes such lawyering acts as
identity-denigrating "acts of naming," in this case naming the black
subject.2 11 Based on racialized judgments, the acts depict Bell "'as the
instigator of the attack,"' infer lawbreaking intent from "'his prior criminal
record,"' and condemn him as morally irredeemable. 212 As I have pointed
out, the "plausibility"-both legal and ethical-of these sorts of judgments

207.
208.

See Alfieri, supranote 3, at 1302.
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depends for Luban on the sociocultural power of the majority
214
community, 21 3 here the Jim Crow white majority of LaSalle Parish.
Like Walters, Jena's majority community of whites "equate colorblackness-with natural inferiority, innate immorality, and pathological
violence." 215 Such cognitive attributions degrade the Jena Six defendants
and the minority community of LaSalle Parish. Degradation occurs in the
courtroom telling of Walters's story-what I have called the "story of blackon-white violence atJena High School," a story that omits "the passions and
sufferings, reflections, relationships, and commitments" of Bell, the other
defendants, their families, and their neighbors. 216 That omission, when
repeated by prosecutors in bench and jury trials, silences the individual and
collective voices of black subjectivity, identity, and community in Jena. The
result for individuals and their communities is humiliation, both personal
217
and historical.
The implied "correlation of race and pathology" 218 at Bell's trial,
coupled with Bell's public acknowledgement of the assault and rebuff of a
plea bargain, confronted his court-appointed black public defender, Blane
Williams, with three strategic options. The first, a colorblind option, entailed
the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" defense attacking the evidentiary
basis of Bell's prosecution. The second, a color- or race-coded option,
offered the more corrosive antebellum defense suggesting the innate or
natural criminal pathology of Bell and the other Jena Six young black male
offenders and, hence, their diminished capacity to form the intent necessary
to conspire or attempt second-degree murder. The third, a color-conscious
option, involved the recitation of Bell's experience and story assailing Jena
as a "racist town" broadened to encompass the Jena Six and the racial history
of LaSalle Parish. This expansive color-conscious option allows the Jena Six
defenders to raise issues of prosecutorial overcharging and selective
prosecution, venue transfer, juvenile court jurisdiction, jury-pool
contamination, and rehabilitative sentencing at trial and on appeal. Both
the second option and, to a lesser extent, the third option echo the familiar
tropes of "social deviance" and "black rage" in seeking to diminish the
capacity of the Jena Six to form the intent or mens rea necessary to attempt

213.
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second-degree murder and to advance a conspiracy. 219 This indignity or
humiliation risk, part of the repressive historical resonance common to
identity affirmations in law and culture, burdens color- or race-conscious
attempts to defend young black male lawbreakers in the criminal-justice
system.
At trial, Williams elected the first option of colorblind neutrality and
"reasonable doubt," raising no challenge to the all-white jury pool, putting
on no evidence, calling no witnesses, and finally excluding Bell's parents
from the courtroom. 220 Consistent with this strategic option, Williams stated:
"I don't believe race is an issue in this trial." 221 That choice decontextualized
the individual stories of the 'Jena Six defendants and the collective history of
LaSalle Parish, bolstered the nonaccountability and professionalism
principles of neutral partisanship, reinforced the separation of law and
politics, and denied the possibility of empowering the legal personality and
legal rights of the young black male offenders through the discourse of
criminal law and procedure.
Subsequently, at post-conviction proceedings, the Monroe pro bono
defense team departed from the strategy of colorblind neutrality and
"reasonable doubt," instead challenging Bell's trial as "unfair" and seeking
to overturn his conviction, vacate the court's sentence, transfer the case to
juvenile court, and convene a new trial.222 The defense team couched this
challenge in a color-coded attack on racial "emotion" and its inflammatory
impact on the white majority-prosecutor, judge, and jury-of LaSalle
Parish. 223 Deployed in this context, the term emotion meekly evokes the
racial passions of Jim Crow era laws and social mores. More specifically, the
defense team claimed that such passions prevented a "fair" trial and
224
sentence.
The public defender's color-blind posture and the post-conviction
team's color-coded pretense did little to establish lawyer-client relationships
that affirm the individual identities of the Jena Six or promote "collective
healing" of the town of Jena. 225 Rather their stances preserved "invidious
status distinctions" and reinforced the divisions of Jim Crow "racial
partition" within the town. 226 Their stances also discounted the legal and
political "opportunity" to trace the sources ofJena's racial violence, to test its
conflicting "motivations," to experiment with community-based "restorative

219. See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 207, 224
(2005) (discussing mens rea and intent).
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policies of redemption and reparation," and to seek "reconciliation through
cross-racial community dialogue." 227 This manifest opportunity arises out of
228
the "legality and justice" norms encoded in criminal and civil-rights laws,
laws that help define the legal personality, the legal rights, and ultimately
the legal-political dignity of black offenders and offender communities.
2,

Dignity-Restoring Relations

Luban's nonhumiliation theorem of human dignity also extends here to
approve dignity-restoring relations of criminal-justice advocacy between
defenders and offenders in cooperation with offender interest groups, such
as families and faith-based organizations, in defense of the Jena Six. Dignityrestoring relations embrace the stories and voices of past and present civilrights movements to "break" from traditional conceptions of the defense
role and function. 229 Both stories and voices of struggle incorporate
"difference-based community" into the defense process. 230 As I have asserted
elsewhere, incorporation of the voices and stories of black-offender families,
faith-based groups, and communities inside and outside courthouses
"opens" the criminal-defense process to race-conscious forms of "civic
participation" beyond grassroots protest movements. 231
Participation of offender support and community groups in the
"formulation" of defense goals and strategies here and in related cases of
black-on-white violence enlarges conventional punitive theories of criminal
justice based on blunt retributive and deterrent calibrations. 23 2 That
participatory enlargement introduces "alternative sanctions" and defense
tactics gleaned from emerging "restorative- and transitional-justice
experiments." 233 Applied tojena through its courts, faith-based institutions,
and schools, restorative justice entails individual and collective acts of
redemptive contrition and forgiving mercy. 234 Cross-racial reconciliation of

227. Id. at 1305; see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for
Lynching, 21 LAW & INEQ. 263, 305-11 (2003) (describing the South African Truth and
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this kind works to integrate "offenders, victims, and their adjoining
communities." 3 5 Integration occurs when difference-based stories of dignity
and humiliation are spoken and heard in shared forums. 236 In this way, I
have pointed out, difference-based stories "foster dialogue between black
and white communities about their mutual interests in redemptive forms of
criminal justice." 237 The "moral conversation" that ensues redefines "the
meaning of human dignity" in pretrial, trial, and post-conviction defense
strategies, eschewing historical caste-status distinctions in favor of race23 8
conscious candor and collaboration.
3.

Community-Empowering Relations

Luban's nonhumiliation theorem of human dignity similarly reaches
out to back community-empowering relations between defenders and
offender communities in the defense of the Jena Six. Communityempowering relations arise out of legal-political opposition to prosecutorial
overcharging, all-white jury selection, disparate juvenile-status treatment,
and sentencing abuse in LaSalle Parish. Prosecutorial misconduct in
creating offender-jury and adult-juvenile racial asymmetry violates
community norms of equal protection and fair representation. Likewise, the
racial "asymmetry" of punishing black-on-white violence and excusing white239
on-black threats of violence threatens "norms of even-handed fairness."
LaSalle Parish's racially disparate treatment of black and white
communities curtails the assertion of "difference-based dignity and equality
interests." 240 Articulated in story, that assertion can resound in open
courtrooms and closed-jury deliberations. Here, the selection of an all-white
jury deprives the Jena Six black offenders and the LaSalle Parish blackoffender communities of a shared "opportunity" to assert their dignitary
241
interests through stories of racial resistance and nonhumiliation.
Historically exacted from white-on-black violence and threats of violence,
deprivation silences stories of protest against indignity. It also "permits a
culture of white-on-black intimidation to flourish" and "preserves black
242
socioeconomic inequality and political powerlessness."
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Restoring black dignity in LaSalle Parish requires defenders to engage
in the race-conscious deregulation of "public space" by giving offenders and
their families a shared voice in trial and sentencing stories. 243 Voice affords
offenders and offender communities the opportunity to "regain their sense
of dignity" in the form of "cultural and social narratives of
empowerment."' 244 Those narratives spur the "organization and
mobilization" of grassroots legal-political opposition to the racialized
prosecution of noose cases.2 45 The integration of identity-affirming, dignityrestoring, and community-empowering defender roles and relationships
under a race-conscious-outsider conception of civil-rights and criminaldefense advocacy reconnects subjectivity, identity, and community to the
experience of racial dignity and humiliation in the criminal-justice system.
The next Section examines the tensions between this conception of
criminal-defense ethics and the Jim Crow ethics of the antebellum defense,
particularly the countervailing tendencies toward contrived ignorance and
integrity.
V. CONTRIVED IGNORANCE AND INTEGRITY IN CRIMINAL-DEFENSE ETHICS

Luban's nonhumiliation theorem of human dignity helps transform the
criminal-justice system into a dignity-affirming institution, and the defender
role into a dignity-restoring relation. The theorem imbues both institutions
and roles with moral properties that return the identity-bearing meaning of
subjectivity to offenders and offender communities, and also fosters a moral
relationship between individual defenders and offender communities. That
deeper relationship carries the moral obligation to value identity-based
differences and commitments. Fulfilling this relational obligation transforms
the role-specific duties of defenders within the criminal-justice system
through identity-affirming, dignity-restoring, and community-empowering
actions.
The transformative integration of affirmative, identity-based obligations
into the role-specific duties of defenders in the Jena Six case clashes with the
"special case" commandment of criminal-defense practice acknowledged by
Luban. 246 Premised on the well-settled theory that aggressive advocacy serves
the political ends and social goals of curtailing the state's power to prosecute
and to punish the most vulnerable, the zealous-advocacy commandment
elevates the goal of protecting individual liberty against state encroachment
to the same status as the goal of attaining legal justice.2 47 In accord with this
commandment and its adversarial compulsion, the antebellum defense
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supplies an exceptional means of achieving the central goal of protecting
the individualJena Six defendants.
Protection, however, need not preclude the relational affirmation of
racial dignity, the courtroom expression of racial identity, and the legalpolitical empowerment of racial community. Yet, the race-coded antebellum
defense and the colorblind defense of the Jena Six discount these
competing aims. More troubling, the defenses deny the moral value of
affirming racial dignity, expressing racial identity, and empowering racial
community.
Luban addresses the notion of deniability broadly through his analysis
of contrived ignorance and integrity in legal ethics. Applied here, deniability
refers to a lawyer's capacity to deny guilty knowledge truthfully. In advocacy,
Luban explains, deniability is a stratagem "to avoid facts that the lawyer
really doesn't want to know." 248 The knowledge and the facts at stake under
antebellum, colorblind, and color-coded defenses relate to the dual
experiences of racial dignity and humiliation, subjectivity and
objectification, and resistance and subordination bound up in the stories of
the Jena Six and the segregated communities of LaSalle Parish. Strategically,
the defenses work to evade the history of such "double" experiences,
allowing both the trial and post-conviction defender teams to avoid guilty
knowledge of the complex facts of individual and collective racial identity in
249
representing the Jena Six.
To ascertain whether deniability works in the criminal-defense process
and in advocacy more generally, Luban investigates the goal, the structure,
and the wrongdoing of willful ignorance. The antebellum, colorblind, and
color-coded defenses applicable to the Jena Six present three categories of
willful ignorance: ignorance of racial dignity, ignorance of racial identity,
and ignorance of racial community. Each category correlates with the Jim
Crow experience of humiliation for individuals, groups, and communities in
LaSalle Parish. At the same time, each category also correlates with the civilrights experiences of dignity, equality, and liberty. Here again, the question
is whether the powerful identity norms of historical struggle impose on
lawyers a serious and countervailing moral obligation of client nonhumiliation sufficient to rebut the professional obligation and political goal
of zealous criminal-justice advocacy embodied in Jim Crow defenses.
Consider first the contours of willful ignorance in terms of the structure of
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contrived ignorance, the locus of wrongdoing, and the nature of willful
blindness.
A.

WILLFUL IGNORANCE

Luban connects deniability to willful ignorance. Criminal-law doctrine
equates willful ignorance with knowledge. For Luban, two intuitive
rationales justify ignorance-based criminal convictions. 250 The first rationale
asserts that the wrongdoer should have known the lawbreaking ramifications
of his actions, implying a legal duty to know and a less culpable standard of
negligence for the failure to know. 251 A second rationale assigns a guilty
mental state to willful blindness.2 52 Both rationales focus on a lawyer's
deliberate efforts to avoid guilty knowledge prior to committing any
misdeed-in this case, an identity-specific misdeed such as reciting client or
community humiliation stories, or worse, prescribing client self-humiliation
stories.
Luban notes that the structure of deniability in organizations-here,
Jena's public-defender office-screens individuals from liability for
misdeeds, including, by extension, identity-based misdeeds. 253 Urging
personal accountability, he observes that the law can apportion individual
responsibility within an organizational context, even where numerous
individuals-such as supervisory public defenders-act at a distance and
with imperfect information. In this way, willful ignorance applies to
misdeeds committed by group enterprises and captures the dimensions of
supervisory wrongdoing. 254 Neither fully reflective of knowledge nor
accurately descriptive of negligence, Luban's notion of willful ignorance
offers a defense strategy for obscuring the identity-based complexity of racial
subjectivity in LaSalle Parish for the Jena Six and others. Fueled by the
disparate motivations and moral intuitions of the Jena Six defense teams,
this obscurantist strategy permits a lawyer affirmatively to take steps to avoid
acknowledging that a colorblind or race-coded story is false or
incomplete. 255 Luban traces this familiar advocacy discretion to the
structure of contrived ignorance.

250. LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance,supra note 248, at 211.
251.
Id. at 212-13.
252. Id. at 213.
253. On organizational structures of deniability, see id. at 215-17.
254. Luban explains: "Supervisors implicitly or explicitly encourage their subordinates to
meet their targets by any means necessary.... Supervisors provide assistance and resources....
And supervisors structure the organization to preserve their own deniability. That's willful
ignorance." LUBAN, ContrivedIgnorance,supra note 248, at 216.
255. See id. at 213-22.
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The Structure of Contrived Ignorance

Luban defines the structure of contrived ignorance in terms of
screening actions and unwitting misdeeds. Screening actions consist of the
actions or omissions by which a lawyer shields himself from unwanted
knowledge-for example, when a line public defender interviewing his
black-offender client breaks off a difficult line of questioning about racial
dignity, identity, or community. Unwitting misdeeds comprise whatever
misdeeds the lawyer subsequently commits that would be innocent if he
were legitimately ignorant-for instance, when a defender evokes the
cultural imagery and narratives of black inferiority to excuse a black
offender's prior criminal history without investigating that history or
consulting with the client about his experience. Luban points out that both
screening actions and unwitting misdeeds can be performed with various
degrees of mens rea. Recall in this respect that willful ignorance describes
the mens rea with which a lawyer contrives his own ignorance. For Luban,
this broad state of mind leaves open the possibility that ignorance can be
contrived at other levels of culpability-for example, willfulness, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence. 256 This opening allows for a search among
multiple levels of culpability for the locus of wrongdoing.
2.

The Locus of Wrongdoing

Luban searches for the locus of wrongdoing to assess whether the
blameworthiness of willful ignorance comes from a lawyer's screening
actions or unwitting misdeeds. That assessment drives the development of a
theory of willful blindness as a form of culpable ignorance. Under Luban's
culpable-ignorance theory, ignorance obtained from wrongfully screening
oneself from guilty knowledge itself becomes blameworthy. Under this
analysis, the wrongful screening action-breaking off a difficult line of
questioning about racial dignity, identity, or community in representing the
Jena Six-bears the primary blame. Yet, for Luban, the unwitting misdeedhere, evoking the cultural imagery and narratives of black inferiority under
the antebellum defense-shares in that blame.
By definition, Luban explains, unwitting misdeeds constitute more than
the innocent causal consequences of wrongful screening actions. In effect,
screening actions put the lawyer on notice of potential wrongdoing such
that his "later self... knows that he performed the screening actions at an
earlier time." 257 Like the ethical obligation of remedial intervention and
rectification, 258 with that knowledge comes "an opportunity to reconsider
and abandon a course of action that might turn out to be an unwitting

256.
257.

Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 225.

258.
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misdeed." 259 Analogizing agency theory and the relationship between a
guilty principal and a reckless agent, Luban reasons that when the screening
lawyer persists in acting, he stands to blame.2 60 Indeed, on this logic, the
more probable the misdeed, the more blameworthy the principal.
The implied principal-agent complicity that binds advocates at two
different times--earlier and later-in the lawyering process unites screening
actions and wrongful misdeeds into a single framework of analysis. This
union treats screening actions and unwitting misdeeds as unitary actions
accomplished when the lawyer-as-agent (the later self who commits the
unwitting misdeed) ratifies the decision of the lawyer-as-principal (the
earlier self) "to screen off potentially guilty knowledge." 261 The unitary
treatment of the lawyer self as a complicit principal-and-agent across a broad
time-frame of racialized screening actions-breaking off a difficult line of
questioning about racial dignity-and unwitting colorblind or race-coded
misdeeds-lawyer- or client-recited narratives of innately deviant criminal
character-highlights the utility of the doctrine of willful blindness in
criminal-defense ethics and its illuminating application to the colorblind
and antebellum defense of the Jena Six.
3.

Willful Blindness

Luban treats willful blindness as morally equivalent to a culpable state
of mind or mens rea for unwitting misdeeds. 262 On this valence, he urges
the inclusion of willful ignorance in lawyers' moral deliberations. Inclusion
acknowledges the case-by-case importance of avoiding and at times engaging
in contrived ignorance. Significantly, for Jim Crow ethics, Luban erects no
intuitive bar to contrived ignorance in lawyer moral deliberations.
Ignorance, he points out, may be the lawyer's best choice when other
morally relevant factors weigh in the balance of advocacy decisions, such as
life or liberty. Moreover, Luban fashions no formal rule of legal ethics
embodying the willful-blindness doctrine. Ethics rules, he shows, burden
lawyers with scant obligations to press a client for knowledge or to
corroborate a client's story, and risk damage to the lawyer-client
263
relationship and disruption of lawyer regulation.
Lacking intuitive restraints or rule prohibitions, lawyers adopt what
Luban describes as an ethically dubious "Don't ask, don't tell" practice of
adversarial advocacy. 264 He discerns this practice in a lawyer's mental state
toward a client's story at that moment in a pretrial interview when he

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

LUBAN, ContrivedIgnorance,supra note 248, at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at211
Id. at 229.
LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 248, at 229-30.
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this case about Mychal

Bell's experiences of racial dignity, identity, or community in LaSalle Parish.
In race cases like the Jena Six, that moment occurs precisely when a public
defender acts to break off a difficult line of questioning or dialogue with the
accused about racial dignity, identity, or community and-thus screened
from knowledge of the dual experiences of racial dignity and humiliation,
subjectivity and objectification, and resistance and subordination common
to segregated communities of color-commits the unwitting misdeed of
reiterating the cultural imagery and narratives of black inferiority and innate
criminality.
To counter the practice of "Don't ask, don't tell" and the silencing of
dignity stories in the lawyering process, Luban considers amending
contemporary legal ethics rules to define willful and knowing ignorance as a
form of knowledge. 266 Incorporating the willful-blindness doctrine into
legal-ethics rules, he remarks, requires amendment of the terminology rule
governing the lawyer-client relationship within the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 267 Currently the terminology rule denotes
"'knowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows"' to mean "actual knowledge of the fact in
question." 268 Luban's proposed amendment adds the phrase: "or conscious
avoidance of actual knowledge of the fact in question." 269 This addition, he
concedes, transforms the lawyer-client relationship by expanding the scope
and altering the content of lawyer inquiry into a client's case. 270 Expansion
of this kind, he also admits, threatens to undermine lawyer-client trust,
invade privileged and confidential conversations, and induce evasive client
tactics. 271
Despite the risk of these unintended regulatory consequences, Luban
argues that the good lawyer should avoid "Don't ask, don't tell" strategies
even without doctrinal or rule prohibition. 272 More generally, he urges
lawyers to avoid willful ignorance of inconvenient knowledge.2 73 On this
vision of the good lawyer, the Jena Six trial and appellate defender teams
should regard it as their duty to learn about the dual experiences of racial
dignity and humiliation, subjectivity and objectification, and resistance and

265.
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subordination shared by the defendants in LaSalle Parish. That duty, Luban
cautions, is not absolute. For Luban, exceptional cases arise "in which the
morally troubling consequences of knowing too much outweigh the duty to
avoid 'Don't ask, don't tell' strategies." 274 In such cases, presumably as here,
he accepts the willful-blindness alternative. Acceptance implies moral
excuse. Accordingly, he concludes that when "telling the truth might defeat
justice, and [when] the stakes are enormous, even a lie might be morally
275
excusable."
Luban's limited acceptance of the willful-blindness alternative
simultaneously seeks to accommodate the core ethics principle of lawyer
candor, to avoid professional discipline for unlawful lying, and to solve the
"dirty hands" dilemma in the criminal defense of noose cases. This
accommodation or "moral loopholing," he insists, applies to a narrow range
of "extreme cases" when a lawyer "putting on a fundamentally truthful case"
advances "a few unimportant false details," which he does not know are in
fact false. 276 Put forward in this way, Luban argues, such cases neither
commit nor count as misdeeds.
Yet, even when candor principles and disciplinary rules survive Luban's
proffered accommodation unimpaired, the willful-blindness alternative
confronts "dirty hands" situations in colorblind and race-coded defense
cases like the Jena Six. Similar to the institutional setting for the transitivity
argument, these situations often call for ruthless, rights-violating activity and
engender experiences of moral regret. Rights-violating activity occurs, for
example, in excluding or ignoring a client-offender's dual experiences of
racial dignity and humiliation, subjectivity and objectification, and resistance
and subordination, and in silencing the voices and stories communicating
such experiences. To his credit, Luban's non-humiliation theorem of
human dignity restrains rights-violating activity and engenders moral regret
when that activity inflicts humiliation or commands self-humiliation.
Nonetheless, racialized "dirty hands" situations pose difficult institutionalrole obligations for public defenders that require normative judgment in
drawing adequate curbs on racial adversariality. For the Jena Six, the curbs
spring from the subjectivity norms of racial dignity, identity, and community
assembled during a half-century of struggle against Jim Crow legal regimes.
Honoring those norms raises questions of integrity and dissonance.
B. INTEGRITY AND DISSONANCE
Luban addresses integrity and dissonance in the clash of lawyer conduct
and ethical principles. Turning to social psychology, he surveys dissonance
theory and dissonance-based phenomena, such as belief modification and
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social cognition, to discover a fundamental psychic mechanism in the
277
human drive to reduce dissonance between conduct and principles.
Typically, he explains, lawyers strive to temper cognitive dissonance by
modifying their conduct to conform to their principles or, when conduct
and principles conflict, by modifying their principles or prior beliefs. For
lawyers, principle-driven conformity risks inflexibility and the loss of
common-law styles of contextual reasoning. 278 Belief modification, by
comparison, risks conscious and unconscious counterattitudinal actions,
such as lawyer-directed client humiliation or lawyer-counseled client self27 9
humiliation underJim Crow defense strategies.
1.

Counterattitudinal Advocacy

Luban explicates the dissonance of counterattitudinal advocacy as a selfrationalizing form of integrity in which a lawyer's beliefs justify his actions
after the fact and, thereby, naturally construct a moral world of continuous
"righteousness." 280 Experiments in social psychology, he points out, reveal
the human tendency to resolve such dissonance when cognitions threaten to
undermine individual self-concept-that is "when it occurs to us that we may
have done something wrong." 281 Intuitively, he reports, lawyers work to
"bend" their moral beliefs and perceptions to "fight off' harsh judgments of
their own behavior. 282 Evidence, he adds, shows that counterattitudinal
advocacy typically tilts beliefs in the direction of advocacy aims. 28 3 In this
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way, the advocacy process tends to channel beliefs into concordance with the
284
means and ends of specific advocacy situations.
The cognitive channeling of means-ends beliefs in counterattitudinal
advocacy gains support from the institutional contexts of the criminal-justice
system. Luban notes that institutional contexts, in this case the LaSalle
Parish prosecutor and public-defender offices, socially influence the
character of individual and collective perception. Here and elsewhere
among race cases, this cognitive phenomenon produces mutually
reinforcing or reciprocal commitments to beliefs, be they right or wrong,
regarding a black offender's dual experiences of racial dignity and
humiliation, subjectivity and objectification, and resistance and
subordination, as well as the presumed advocacy need for lawyer-directed
client humiliation or lawyer-counseled client self-humiliation. 285 Luban links
the institutional diffusion of individual responsibility in organizational
settings to the reciprocal reinforcement of perception and commitment by
noting, "once I act, my beliefs will rationalize the action and therefore impel
me to further action of the same sort-which, in turn, calls for renewed
286
rationalization, and further action."
Social psychologists, according to Luban, attribute this pattern of
action-commitment-action to the self's incessant pursuit of integrity
experienced intuitively through belief-action harmony. 287 Lawyers, he
comments, reformulate their self-concept in a way that rationalizes their own
actions. 288 Because of the self-reinforcing character of commitment, a
lawyer-defender's self-conception impels further, structurally similar,
rationalizing action bolstered by group social cognition and individual belief
modification. The adversary system sustains these patterns of decisionmaking by framing litigation as a social competition marked by group
polarization and in-group favoritism. As a result of polarization and beliefchange, Luban mentions, lawyers become committed to their own courses of
action and equally committed to other members of their "team" in litigation
competitions, such as in the prosecution and defense of the racial violence
involving the Jena Six, where socially scripted roles shape the "psychic make289
up" of LaSalle Parish prosecutors and defenders.

284. Luban offers two observations on psychological theory and cognitive dissonance: first,
that cognitive-dissonance theory maintains a kind of primacy; and second, that dissonance
reduction resembles the quest for integrity. LUBAN, Integrity, supra note 279, at 269-71.
285. Id. at 272 ("Evidently, we respond to situations by checking to see how other people
respond, and their response in large measure determines how we perceive the situation and
therefore how we ourselves will respond.").
286. Id. at 273.
287. Id. at 274.
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Situationism

The portrait of lawyer cognition and dissonance that Luban culls from
the literature of social psychology depicts a sociolegal world where "there
are no selves, only selves-in-roles, selves who slide frictionlessly from role to
role, in each case conforming to the expectations of the role and whatever
principles of right behavior come attached to its script." 290 To better
understand this role-scripted sociolegal world, Luban considers the
situationist view "that differences in situations account for much more of the
291
observed variation in human behavior than do differences in personality."
He cites experiments indicating that the power of a situation appears to
dominate over the power of individual personality and character in
determining advocacy behavior. 292 Although conceding that situational
changes can affect the proportion of individuals exhibiting a given behavior,
he notes that situationists struggle to account for belief-action variation
293
among individuals placed in the same situation.
For a fuller account of behavioral variation, Luban embraces personality
theory and the notion of situational dissent. 294 Far less deterministic, this
account treats situations as sources of environmental pressure or temptation,
the minor manipulation of which may cause large changes in the ease or
difficulty of certain courses of action. 295 On this reading, situations set the
conditions for decision-making, for example in screening or committing
unwitting misdeeds, rather than render choice impossible. Luban's
opposition to situational determinism, and the related reductionist claim of
institutionally scripted roles existing without any core or larger unity of self,
allows for an alternative conception of integrity envisioned as "a complex
unity, stitched together with a great deal of self-deception that allows us to
296
deny inconsistencies and the dissonance they induce."
3.

Integrity

Under his alternative conception, Luban imagines integrity in terms of
personal adherence to a set of right or reasonable principles.297 Adherence
entails not only keeping principles intact, but also bringing actions into
conformity with principles. To Luban, the ethical value of integrity derives
from the experience of harmony or equilibrium between values and
290. Id. at 281.
291. Id.
292. See id. (Stanford Prison Experiment); id. at 282 (Milgram experiment and Isen and
Levin experiment).
293. Id. at 283.
294. DAVID LUBAN, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHics AND HuMAN
DIGNITY, supra note 22, at 237, 245-48.
295. Id. at 246-47.
296. LUBAN, Integrity, supranote 279, at 285.
297. Id. at 286-87.
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actions. 298 In evaluating that experience, however, he admits that the quest
for integrity and the process of self-rationalization seem almost
indistinguishable. 299 Lacking a clear distinction between integrity and roleinduced rationalization in lawyer decision-making, Luban recommends
three remedial strategies: line-drawing, counter-intuitive reflection, and
chronic skepticism. 300
In the context of defending the Jena Six, line-drawing requires
boundaries demarcating colorblind, race-coded, and race-conscious forms of
advocacy. The boundaries mark the limits of race-based, adversarial
ruthlessness in criminal-defense cases. That institutional limitation on the
duties of partisan advocacy and the role obligations of professionalism rise
out of the serious, countervailing moral obligation to honor racial dignity,
identity, and community.
Counter-intuitive reflection demands uncovering client dignity in the
experience of humiliation, uncovering client subjectivity in the experience
of objectification, and uncovering client resistance in the experience of
subordination. Lawyer acts of uncovering demonstrate a willingness to take
client cares and commitments seriously in advocacy instead of overriding
those commitments and humiliating clients for paternalistic reasons, even
when those reasons safeguard client life and liberty.
Chronic skepticism dictates challenging the need for lawyer-directed
client humiliation or lawyer-counseled client self-humiliation in advocacy.
That challenge casts doubt on the presumption that lawyers must fulfill their
role obligations in the face of competing commitments to the ordinary
morality of human dignity. Ordinary morality demands the respectful
treatment of clients as rights-bearers and, thus, proscribes self-alienation and
the degradation of individual subjectivity. Distilled from Luban, these
cognitive and interpretive strategies construct a Socratic "stance of perpetual
doubt toward one's own pretensions as well as the pretensions of others" in
the world, a stance that instills the crucial "habit of doubting one's own
righteousness, of questioning one's own moral beliefs, of scrutinizing one's
301
own behavior."
VI. CONCLUSION

Like the prosecution of the Jena Six, the defense of the Jena Six raises
difficult questions about race embedded "within the professional norms,
practice traditions, and ethics rules of the criminal justice system." 30 2 And,
like its predecessor, this Article addresses those questions in the context of
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the de jure and de facto racial segregation of LaSalle Parish. Emerging
studies of the legal profession in the contexts of antebellum and postbellum
segregation continue to encounter both colorblind and color-coded claims
espoused by prosecutors and defenders, especially the contention of the
"natural" criminal pathology of black male offenders and the corresponding
narrative denigration of the mental capacity and moral character of black
offenders and their communities. Both kinds of race-based identity claims
shape the image and story of offenders, victims, and affected communities.
The adversarial "embrace" of humiliating race-based identity claims by
prosecutors and defenders underscores the importance of the "call for the
preservation of dignity in the relationships defined by the law, legal agents,
and sociolegal institutions" of the prosecution and defense function and the
criminal-justice system more generally.303 When applied here and elsewhere
to the contemporary civil-rights movement and joined with critical theories
of race, that "call condemns the identity-degrading and communitydisempowering relationships" of both prosecutors and defenders with varied
30 4
"black offenders and offender communities."
Beyond condemnation, this Article also strives for the "elaboration of a
difference-based, antisubordination account of legal ethics and lawyer
roles."30 5 Indeed, the goal here is to craft alternative civil-rights and
criminaljustice approaches to noose-related incidents of racial violence. To
that end, it "draws on the identity norms of the civil-rights movement and
critical race theory to counter the marginalization of people in legal
relationships marked by differences of class, gender, or race. ' 30 6 This
derivation, I have argued, and the enunciation of a "transformative account
of legal ethics and lawyer roles that emphasizes the normative values of
difference-based identity and community-driven legal-political resistance to
the humiliation of racial inequality enhances human dignity and returns
lawyers to a racialized world of moral ambiguity."30 7 Enhancement
crystallizes the "hard dilemmas" fueled by the "self-deceptions, mixed
motives, and good intentions" of advocacy, ineluctably pushing prosecutors
and defenders "outside the facile role of neutral partisanship into the moral
30 8
complexity of ethical judgment."
As I have pointed out previously, Luban "reinstills the ideal of moral
activism into the ordinary work" of lawyer defenders battling the 2006
prosecution of theJena Six in LaSalle Parish, Louisiana.309 His "ideal locates
303.
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moral responsibility for injustice in the daily practice of law"-interviewing,
counseling, and trial advocacy. By attending to "the work of lawyers in
ordinary practice," Luban shows how prosecutors and defenders "exercise
good and bad judgment" based on insider and outsider perspectives toward
"moral obligation." 310 As before, Luban to some extent cedes "priority to
insider role obligation" citing "reasons of moral psychology and professional
coherence," thereby treating "role obligation as a baseline presumption that
may be rebutted and overridden" by strong outsider "moral reasons,"
including the "common morality" of affirming racial dignity, expressing
311
racial identity, and empowering racial community.
In this significant way, Luban's dignitary conception advances the
development of a difference-based, antisubordination account of legal ethics
and lawyers' roles, integrating racial identity and human-dignity norms and
merging non-humiliation and antisubordination narratives. To be sure,
identity-affirming normative integration and narrative incorporation in the
"special case" of criminal-defense practice where, as here, zealous advocacy
serves the atypical political ends and social goals of curtailing the state's
power to prosecute and to punish its most vulnerable citizens-in this case
among the Jena Six-present difficult moral dilemmas. These advocacy
dilemmas set the political goal of safeguarding liberty and the social goal of
legal justice against the legal-political norms of affirming racial dignity,
expressing racial identity, and empowering racial community. Remembering
the days of Jim Crow racial bondage enables defenders to break role in
collaboration with offenders and offender communities in pursuit of
Luban's dignitary conception of ethics and to resolve cooperatively the
enduring dilemmas of race in the criminal-justice system.
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